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Theocracy in America: Should Core First
Amendment Values Be Permanent?
by MIRIAM GALSTON*
The ultimate measure of a constitution is how it balances
entrenchment and change.
Erwin Chemerinsky'
Introduction: The Threat of Theocracy in America
The Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas,2 holding a
Texas statute criminalizing consensual sexual relations between same-
sex individuals as unconstitutional, unleashed a storm of protest.
Those most alarmed feared the Court's reasoning could be used to
challenge laws prohibiting same-sex marriage, polygamy, or worse.
The decision renewed calls for a constitutional amendment to define
marriage as the union of one man and one woman.' Some proposals
for a marriage amendment would, in addition, deny public entities the
* Associate Professor, The George Washington University Law School. I am
grateful to Bruce Ackerman, Mary Cheh, Bill Galston, Sandy Levinson, Dick Pierce,
Catherine Ross, and Mike Seidman, who were gracious enough to read earlier versions of
this Article and make thoughtful suggestions for improving the argument. As always,
Dean Fred Lawrence and The George Washington University Law School generously
supported my research and writing. I owe much as well to the fine and unflagging
research assistance of Matthew Mantel, Jen McClure, Rachel Bohlen, Kaitlin Dunne,
Rosemary Englert, and Beth Alyson Yenis.
1. Erwin Chemerinsky, Amending the Constitution, 96 MICH. L. Rev. 1561, 1561
(1998).
2. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
3. See id. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that the holding jeopardizes
previous rulings upholding state laws "against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest,
prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity.").
4. See H.R.J. Res. 56, 108th Cong. (2003) (defining marriage in the United States as
consisting only of a union between one man and one woman); Federal Marriage
Amendment, S.J. Res. 40, 108th Cong. (2004). Similar proposals have been introduced in
each successive year. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 22, 110th Cong. (2007). All versions have
failed to pass either house. See Edward Stein, Past and Present Proposed Amendments to
the United States Constitution Regarding Marriage, 82 WASH. U.L.Q. 611 (2004).
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authority to accord same-sex unions or other domestic partnerships
the civil rights and benefits ordinarily bestowed upon married
couples.5
This is not the first time a portion of the public contemplated
overturning a Supreme Court decision by constitutional amendment,6
although it may be the first attempt to do so preemptively. In recent
decades, many such attempts have been motivated by the desire to
constitutionalize religious values the Supreme Court found at
variance with the Constitution. Notably, Roe v. Wade,7 which
afforded constitutional protection to certain abortions, sparked a
flood of proposals to amend the Constitution to curtail or eliminate
this protection. Several of the abortion proposals explicitly prohibit
abortion based on the proposition, elevated to constitutional status,
that the right to life as a human being begins at the moment of
conception.8 Similarly, the Court's determinations that voluntary
5. See H.R.J. Res. 22, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007); H.R.J. Res. 39, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005).
6. Only a decade after the Constitution was ratified, the Eleventh Amendment was
approved in order to overturn Chisholm v. Georgia, which had permitted a citizen of one
state to sue the government of another state. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (upholding the
plaintiff's claim to recover an amount owed by the State for goods it purchased and
received). The Sixteenth Amendment was approved in response to the Supreme Court
decision striking down a federal income tax enacted in 1894. See Pollack v. Farmers' Loan
and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895). During the Lochner era, the Supreme Court
frequently invalidated protective social legislation as outside the scope of Congress'
powers under the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525
(1923) (invalidating minimum wage law for women because it violated freedom of
contract); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922) (invalidating federal tax
statute enacted to regulate child labor); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918)
(invalidating the Child Labor Tax). These decisions gave rise to numerous attempts to
amend the Constitution to overrule the Court's holdings. See H.R.J. Res. 354, 75th Cong.
(1938) (all proposing child labor amendments); H.R.J. Res. 184, 68th Cong. (1924); S.J.
Res. 1, 68th Cong. (1924); S.J. Res. 262, 67th Cong. (1923); S.J. Res. 256, 67th Cong.
(1923); S.J. Res. 232, 67th Cong. (1923); S.J. Res. 224, 67th Cong. (1923); S.J. Res. 200,
67th Cong. (1923). More recently, decisions upholding the right to burn the U.S. flag on
free speech grounds, see United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (holding the 1990
federal Flag Protection Act unconstitutional as a violation of the First Amendment's
protection of expressive conduct);Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (holding that state
laws prohibiting desecration of the flag violated the Free Speech clause of the First
Amendment), gave rise to two decades of attempts to amend the Constitution to prohibit
flag burning and other forms of flag desecration. One of these proposals passed the House
by the requisite two-thirds majority. See H.R.J. Res. 12, 109th Cong. (2005).
7. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
8. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 294, 96th Cong. (1979); H.R.J. Res. 427, 93rd Cong. (1973);
H.R.J. Res. 261, 93rd Cong. (1973); S.J. Res. 3, 98th Cong. (1983); S.J. Res. 110, 97th
Cong. (1982). See also H.R.J. Res. 4, 109th Cong. (2005).
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school prayer violates the Establishment Clause9 provoked numerous
bills to amend the Constitution to permit school prayer and allow
public officials to include voluntary prayer at official events.'0
These developments are disturbing because they seek to
stipulate, as a matter of constitutional law, the veracity of religious
beliefs not shared by all Americans and to impose or prohibit
practices whose justification depends upon those beliefs. The
proposed conception amendment provides a dramatic illustration of
the danger. Under Jewish law, for example, human life does not
begin at conception," and a pregnancy may be terminated within
forty days without violating Jewish strictures.2 Relatedly, because
"the traditional Jewish perspective does not accord an embryo
outside of the womb the full status of humanhood," Orthodox Jewish
authorities have concluded that stem cell research is not only
permitted; such research is a moral obligation, because of its potential
to fulfill the religious command to heal the sick. 3 Thus if enacted,
amendments to establish the right to life at conception could
interfere with the ability of those who observe Jewish law, as
well as others who disagree with the amendment's premise, to
exercise their religion freely.
These recent attempts to constitutionalize religious values have a
long lineage. During the founding period, critics frequently attacked
9. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (invalidating a daily recitation of
"denominationally neutral" prayer); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (invalidating a
moment of silence in the classroom). See also Santa Fe Indep. School Dist. v. Doe, 530
U.S. 290 (2000) (invalidating school led prayer at high school athletic events).
10. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 307, 99th Cong. (1985); H.R.J. Res. 279, 99th Cong. (1985);
H.R.J. Res. 201, 99th Cong. (1985); H.R.J. Res. 55, 99th Cong. (1985); H.R.J. Res. 4, 99th
Cong. (1985); S.J. Res. 2, 99th Cong. (1985). These efforts have continued to the present
day. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 41, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R.J. Res. 21, 109th Cong. (2005); S.J.
Res. 11, 110th Cong. (2007).
11. See Rabbi Moshe Dovid Tendler, Stem Cell Research and Therapy: A Judeo-
Biblical Perspective, in 3 ETHICAL ISSUES IN HUMAN STEM CELL RESEARCH H-1, H-3-
H-4 (National Bioethics Advisory Commission, 2000) (stating that the "Judeo-biblical
tradition does not grant moral status to an embryo before forty days of gestation ... The
proposition that humanhood begins at zygote formation, even in vitro, is without basis in
[Jewish] biblical moral theology.").
12. See Rabbi Yitzchok Breitowitz, The Preembryo in Halacha,
http://www.jlaw.com/Articles/preemb.html (last visited September 13, 2009) (noting the
distinction made in Talmud between embryos before the 40th day of the pregnancy and
embryos after that time).
13. See Letter from the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations to Members of the
House of Representatives, Jan. 8, 2007, http://www.ouradio.orglimages/uploads/StemCell-
07 hr3.pdf.
Fall 2009] THEOCRACY IN AMERICA
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
the Constitution's failure to mention God, religion, or the Scriptures.
14
Subsequently, the "Christian amendment movement" emerged
around the time of the Civil War,15 and in the ensuing decades, bills
were regularly introduced in Congress to amend the Constitution to
acknowledge the existence of God, establish Christianity as the
religion of the United States, and/or recognize the authority of Jesus
Christ or the Old and New Testament. 6  As recently as 1967,
members of Congress proposed an amendment to establish that
"[t]his Nation devoutly recognizes the authority and law of Jesus
Christ, Saviour and Ruler of nations, through whom are bestowed the
blessing of Almighty God."'7
Although they no longer attempt to amend the Constitution to
affirm the authority and law of Jesus Christ explicitly, members of
Congress continue to introduce resolutions recognizing the
importance of Christianity." In the latter half of the twentieth
century, the majority of religiously motivated proposed amendments
aimed to constitutionalize religious values by affirming both specific
practices and rights, such as school prayer, or the right to life from the
moment of fertilization, 9 and more general rights, such as the right
"to recognize ... religious beliefs, heritage, or traditions on public
property, including schools."2
14. See ISAAC KRAMNICK & R. LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS CONSTITUTION:
THE CASE AGAINST RELIGIOUS CORRECTNESS 32-37 (1996) (describing criticism
expressed during the ratifying conventions); FRANK LAMBERT, THE FOUNDING FATHERS
AND THE PLACE OF RELIGION IN AMERICA 254-58 (2003). On attitudes toward religion
and government during the colonial period, see LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND
FREEDOM 63-80 (1953). See also infra note 18.
15. See KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note 14, at 144-48.
16. See JOHN R. VILE, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS,
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, AND AMENDING ISSUES 1789-1995, 49-51 (1996); KRAMNICK
& MOORE, supra note 14, at 144-48; Daniel L. Dreisbach, In Search of a Christian
Commonwealth: An Examination of Selected Nineteenth-Century Commentaries on
References to God and the Christian Religion in the United States Constitution, 48 BAYLOR
L. REV. 927 (1996).
17. H.R.J. Res. 223, 90th Cong. (1967).
18. See, e.g., H.R. Res. 847, 110th Cong. (2007) (recognizing the importance of
Christianity and Christians in the founding of the United States and in the United States
and the rest of the world today, asserting that Christianity is one of the world's great
religions, and acknowledging the "international religious and historical importance" of
Christmas).
19. See supra notes 8, 10.
20. H.R.J. Res. 78, 105th Cong. (1997). See H.R.J. Res. 161, 104th Cong. (1996)
(stating that "[n]othing in this Constitution shall prohibit either public or private
acknowledgment of God, the Creator; and neither the United States nor any State shall
[Vol. 37:1
This Article is inspired by these recent developments. Although
ostensibly less sweeping than the earlier proposals of the Christian
amendment movement, the recent efforts to constitutionalize the
practices or beliefs of certain religious denominations could propel
the United States toward theocracy in significant ways. Specifically, if
ratified, some of these amendments will deny the free exercise of
religion to those who do not share those beliefs by preventing them
from acting in accordance with their own religious beliefs. Although
the protection afforded by the religion clauses is not absolute,
restricting it in the name of one population's religious beliefs, rather
than a compelling state interest, would be contrary to the nation's
longstanding commitment to freedom of conscience. Thus, on a
theoretical level, the adoption of such amendments would redefine a
core feature of the nation's constitutional identity-namely, the
conception of religious liberty embodied in the religion clauses of the
First Amendment.2'
This Article examines ways to prevent such a change from
occurring. Constitutional theorists have elaborated two distinct legal
strategies to ensure the perpetuation of fundamental constitutional
norms threatened by potential or recently ratified amendments.
Some commentators, such as constitutional scholar Laurence Tribe,
argue that certain substantive principles implicit in the Constitution
are responsible for its coherence and identity and that the content of
these implicit substantive norms would prevent inconsistent
subsequent amendments from being valid.22 Other legal theorists,
such as Bruce Ackerman, suggest formally entrenching First
Amendment or other constitutional values by ratifying an
make any law, nor any Judicial System issue any judgment which restricts the recognition
of the Almighty God and our individual and joint dependence on Him.").
21. See Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 132-39 (1943) (emphasizing the
centrality of freedom of conscience, belief, and thought among the "principles of the
Constitution"). This Article does not presuppose that the religion clauses require an
absolute separation of church and state. For the view that, at the time of the Founding,
the establishment clause was understood to permit support of religion by the national
government as long as it fell short of establishment, see MICHAEL MALBIN, RELIGION
AND POLITICS: THE INTENTIONS OF THE AUTHORS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1978).
See also PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 63, 481 (2002);
Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1157, 1161-62
(1991) (suggesting that the First Amendment was intended to protect states' rights to
establish religions and also to recognize states' control over education); John S. Baker, Jr.,
The Establishment Clause as Intended: No Preference Among Sects and Pluralism in a
Large Commercial Republic, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING AND
CURRENT UNDERSTANDING 41, 41-42, 45-47 (Eugene W. Hickok, Jr., ed. 1991).
22. See infra Part 1.
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amendment that explicitly declares such provisions unamendable.
Such formal entrenchment would obstruct, if not render impossible,
attempts to use Article V to modify or eliminate the values
guaranteed by the entrenching amendment.23
This Article explores the strengths and weaknesses of both of
these approaches to prevent efforts to constitutionalize religious
values. Part I of this Article considers the concept of implicit
substantive constraints that would limit constitutional change,
examines its historical antecedents, and reviews different legal
materials that could serve as sources of such constraints. Part I also
discusses the practical difficulties in identifying core constitutional
values and the absence of an appropriate institution with which to
entrust this determination. It concludes that, although reasonable
arguments exist in support of the existence of implicit, self-limiting
constitutional principles, they are outweighed by the fact that there is
no institution that could make such determinations in an authoritative
fashion.
Part II considers an alternative method of protecting core
constitutional values-namely, making them unamendable through
entrenching amendments. This Part begins by explaining the concept
of express constitutional entrenchment, i.e., ratifying a constitutional
amendment making certain constitutional values unamendable. It
then reviews what the drafters of the Constitution and others who
influenced the character of the emerging republic thought about the
desirability of the Constitution being resistant to change. The final
two sections of Part II analyze both the constitutionality and the
desirability of adopting unalterable constitutional provisions. Part II
concludes that there are genuine benefits as well as potential dangers
of having constitutional provisions entrenched through an explicit
entrenching amendment. It also argues that implementing such
amendments would pose less of an institutional problem than
enforcing implicit substantive constraints. However, formal
constitutional entrenchment poses numerous problems that call its
feasibility into question.
Because of the difficulties inherent in both of the approaches
discussed, this Article recommends proceeding along other, less
formal paths to ensure the permanence of particular constitutional
norms. It sketches the type of educational and civic initiatives that
23. See infra Part II. For a discussion on the possibility that formal entrenchment
might not be effective in preventing changes to constitutional norms through means other
than Article V see infra Part II.D.2.
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could be employed to decrease the current threat to the religion
clauses. 4  Just as religiously based proposals to amend the
Constitution have been motivated by non-legal norms, establishing
countervailing non-legal norms will be necessary to assure the
permanence of the religion clauses' current legal protections.
Because the American public's commitment to the Constitution is, in
general, widespread and deep, I suggest pursuing the goal of
entrenchment by building upon this commitment and educating
Americans about the essential connection between the constitutional
norm of religious freedom and the need to refrain from
constitutionalizing a particular denomination's religious beliefs.
I. Constitutional Fundamentals and Self-Limiting Principles
For a formal amendment to the Constitution to be enforceable, it
must be adopted in accordance with the procedural requirements set
forth in Article V.25 Nonetheless, some scholars, and concerned
citizens have argued that an amendment to the Constitution could be
invalid based on its content, even if it were adopted following Article
V procedures. This invalidation might occur if the amendment proved
inconsistent with existing provisions that comprise foundational
principles or core values intrinsic to the form of government
established by the Constitution. According to this view, foundational
principles or core values represent an essential part of the specific
constitutional order that defines the United States political
community. By virtue of their essential place in the American form
of constitutional democracy, such principles or values are, in effect,
unamendable. Only a change of regime could remove provisions,
principles, or values of this kind.
This Part discusses this idea of implicit substantive constraints
preventing the adoption of possible amendments to the Constitution
based on their content. It examines the ways in which such
24. See infra Part II.E.
25. See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 428 (1956) (asserting that "[n]othing
new can be put into the Constitution except through the amendatory process."). See also
David A. Strauss, Commentary: The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114
HARV. L. REV. 1457, 1458 (2001). However, numerous commentators believe that the
Article V procedures are not the exclusive means to amend the Constitution. See, e.g.,
Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013
(1984) (arguing that under certain conditions, changes in the national consensus about
fundamental principles should be considered as an amendment and should be binding
upon courts); Akhil Reed Amar, Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment
Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1994) (justifying a national referendum as a
valid way to ratify an amendment); see also infra notes 233-38 and accompanying text.
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constraints, if they exist, would entrench certain features of the
Constitution. It reviews the historical instances in which the concept
of implicit substantive constraints has been advanced-usually in
response to the ratification of a formal amendment that opponents
view as running counter to the spirit of the established regime. This
Part also discusses several theories about how the source or locus of
such limiting principles or values can be identified. The last section
analyzes practical obstacles to enforcing implicit substantive
constraints on constitutional change even when such constraints can
be justified on the level of constitutional theory.
A. The Concept of Implicit Substantive Constraints on Amendments
As the following discussion explains, implicit substantive
constraints can be unwritten or part of the written text of the
Constitution. Even if expressly stated in the text of the document,
they will nonetheless be "implicit" constraints insofar they are
considered foundational or otherwise essential to the American
constitutional order in a way that other explicit constitutional
provisions are not. For example, it is unlikely that anyone would
challenge a proposal to amend the Constitution to raise the minimum
age for holding certain public offices by five years on the ground that
to do so would significantly alter the character of the American form
of government, whereas one can imagine such a challenge if the Free
Exercise Clause were the target of a proposed amendment. In the
latter case, the argument against the proposed amendment would
likely include the claim that the Free Exercise Clause is central to the
American form of governance in a way that the age of the chief
executive is not." In other words, the implicit nature of the Free
Exercise Clause is its trumping character, i.e., its ability to preclude
constitutional amendments that conflict with it in a significant way. A
second category of limiting principles or values could be implicit in
two respects: because they are not part of the written text and
because of their trumping character.
The following example illustrates the idea of an express
provision of the Constitution precluding certain types of properly
adopted amendments from being valid. Assume that two or more
provisions of the Constitution are inseparable analytically. If an
26. Sanford Levinson cautions that changes to minimum ages of public officials could
alter the character of the regime if the new minimums were in the 50-60 years range, as
could a constitutional amendment to require Presidents to have two citizen parents in
order to qualify for that office. Personal communication from Levinson to author (August
12, 2009) (on file with author).
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amendment eliminated only one of the provisions, it would generate a
contradiction within the document. As a consequence, even if the
amendment had been adopted in accordance with Article V
procedures, it could nonetheless be viewed as invalid by virtue of its
content.
To see how this could occur in practice, consider a passage in
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia:
The right of access to places traditionally open to the public...
may be seen as assured by the amalgam of the First
Amendment guarantees of speech and press; and their affinity
to the right of assembly is not without relevance. From the
outset, the right of assembly was regarded not only as an
independent right but also as a catalyst to augment the free
exercise of the other First Amendment rights with which it was
deliberately linked by the draftsmen."
Rehnquist based his assertion of the connection among the three
First Amendment rights on an earlier Court's argument that "[t]he
right of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of free speech
and free press and is equally fundamental."" Similarly, the majority
in Richmond Newspapers noted "there was no need separately to
assert the right of assembly because it was subsumed in freedom of
speech."2 9 The statements from both the majority and the dissent
suggest that an amendment written to eliminate the constitutional
protection for the right of assembly could not take effect because the
right of assembly would still be entailed by the surviving cognate right
of free speech. Along similar lines, constitutional theorist Lawrence
H. Tribe has argued that an amendment repealing the No Test Oath
Clause of Article VI by making belief in God a qualification for
federal office would nonetheless be inconsistent with the
Establishment Clause as well as the implicit protection for freedom of
conscience."
27. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 577 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (although agreeing with the majority that the First Amendment guaranties had
implicit in them the right to attend criminal trials, disagreeing about the Court's role).
28. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937).
29. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 577 n.13 (attributing the view to the founding
period).
30. See Laurence H. Tribe, A Constitution We Are Amending: In Defense of a
Restrained Judicial Role, 97 HARV. L. REV. 433, 439-440 (1983). This may appear to
make the difficulty posed by cognate rights no more than a drafting problem. In some
instances that might be the case. But it is also possible that a national consensus could
exist to eliminate the right of assembly without a concomitant consensus to eliminate the
Fall 2009]
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Implicit substantive limitations on amendments could also be
derived from non-express aspects of existing constitutional provisions,
e.g., the principle(s) or purpose(s) of an explicit provision that is the
target of a hypothetical new amendment.3 For example, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly indicated that the right of free speech and the
right of freedom of religious worship are grounded in a more
fundamental concept: The individual's freedom of conscience or
freedom of mind.32 So understood, the implicit "right of freedom of
thought" is conceptualized as the foundation of the right of free
speech,33 or as one of its foundations,34 and it is equated with the
freedom of conscience that is the basis of the free exercise of religion
and "the counterpart... right to refrain from accepting the creed
established by the majority."35 Of course, there is no right to freedom
of thought or conscience stated in the text of the Constitution, which
refers explicitly only to rights that presuppose the importance of the
unstated right.
To illustrate the cognate rights approach, consider a new
amendment authorizing state and local districts to permit or require
prayer in public schools. Although ratified using Article V
procedures, the amendment could be seen as significantly altering the
rights of speech and press. If so, the presence of cognate rights surviving in the
Constitution would serve as a barrier to the effectiveness of the amendment adopted to
eliminate the right to assembly.
31. Walter F. Murphy is a prolific defender of implicit substantive constraints limiting
constitutional change. See, e.g., Walter F. Murphy, Merlin's Memory: The Past and Future
Imperfect of the Once and Future Polity, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 163, 175-81 (Sanford
Levinson ed., 1995); Walter F. Murphy, Slaughter House, Civil Rights, and Limits on
Constitutional Change, 32 AM. J. JURIS. 1 (1987); Walter F. Murphy, An Ordering of
Constitutional Values, 53 SO. CAL. L. REV. 703, 754-57 (1980). For the opposing view,
including a direct repudiation of Murphy's arguments, see John R. Vile, The Case against
Implicit Limits on the Constitutional Amending Process, in RESPONDING TO
IMPERFECTION, supra, at 191. For additional authorities endorsing or rejecting the
possibility of implicit substantive constraints, see infra note 133.
32. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 50-52 (1985); Webster v. Reprod. Health
Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 572 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting); infra note 34.
33. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977).
34. Freedom of speech can also be seen as fundamental in its own right in a
democracy because of its role in facilitating an enlightened citizenry that participates in
the political life of the community. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST
93-94 (1980). See also Jason Mazzone, Unamendments, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1747, 1750
(2005) (asserting that freedom of speech and press are so "essential to democracy" that
they cannot be amended away).
35. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 52.
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free exercise clause as well as the establishment clause.36
Consequently, the hypothetical school prayer amendment could be
deemed unconstitutional because it would conflict with the unstated
but surviving principle of freedom of conscience or thought that
informs the free speech and free press provisions as well as the Free
Exercise Clause.37 Alternatively, an amendment prohibiting abortion
on that basis that human life begins at conception could be
invalidated as conflicting with the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses since some religions do not fix the beginning of life at birth
and, consequently, would permit abortions prohibited under the
amendment. s
A third version of implicit substantive constraints derives the
limitations on future amendments from features of the basic structure
of the American form of government, rather than from specific
fundamental rights. Take a simple hypothetical: an amendment
ratified in accordance with Article V procedures that transferred a
portion of the powers of the President to some kind of constitutional
monarch or king who would govern for life, unless impeached.
Assuming that the hypothetical amendment would expressly modify
Article I, Section 9, Clause 8 (no titles of nobility), the Twenty-
Second Amendment (term limits), and any other provisions that
might be deemed inconsistent with the kingship amendment, there
would be no "cognate provision" problem. In addition, the position
of king for life would not, in and of itself, necessarily prevent the
resulting constitutional order from being a democracy.39 Nonetheless,
it would be possible to view the terms of the new amendment as so
inconsistent with core values of the American form of democracy
established by the Constitution as to make the amendment invalid
36. The amendment would undermine the Free Exercise Clause, even if no student
would be required to say the prayer, because of the atmosphere of coercion created by the
mandatory reading. See, e.g., Brief of Petitioners, Murray v. Curlett, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)
(No. 62-119), 1962 WL 115516 (arguing to invalidate a state statute mandating Bible
reading in public schools). Cf H.R.J. Res. 46, 108th Cong. (2003) (proposing an
amendment to the Constitution to guarantee people's right to pray, etc., on public
property, including in the pledge of allegiance to the flag, while also stating no person
would be "required" to join in any prayer or religious activity).
37. Not all legal theorists, much less constitutional scholars, would view a law's
purpose as itself part of the law rather than as an extralegal source of the law. See, e.g.,
H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593,
627-29 (1958).
38. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
39. Consider, for example, the Principality of Monaco, the Kingdom of Morocco, and
the Principality of Liechtenstein, all of which have constitutional monarchs, but popularly
elected parliaments with legislative powers.
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based upon its content. To take a related example, would it be
possible to subordinate significant aspects of the powers of the
executive and judicial branches to the legislative by means of an
Article V amendment so that the form of government would be a
parliamentary democracy such as exists in Great Britain? ' ° Answering
the latter question requires deciding whether separation of powers is
an essential feature of democracy in America or simply one possible
technique for achieving certain goals.' Thus, the analysis would go
beyond identifying which rights are fundamental to the regime to
considering which structural features, if any, are necessary
components of the American constitutional order.
Issues of this kind were raised in India when Parliament adopted
an amendment initiated by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi that limited
the judiciary's ability to review amendments and relieved Gandhi of
liability for election fraud. The amendment was challenged, in part,
as conflicting with the basic structure of the country's constitutional
order. In a decision rendered in 1973, the Indian Supreme Court
stated that an amendment to the Indian constitution would be invalid
if it was inconsistent with the constitution's "basic structure," even
though it was adopted in accordance with the constitution's amending
procedures.43 Most of the Justices wrote separate opinions, but a
majority of the Court endorsed the general proposition affirming
40. See John R. Vile, American Views of the Constitutional Amending Process: An
Intellectual History of Article V, 35 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 44, 56 (1991) (describing a
proposal in the 1860s to enable Congress to pass amendments). See also Justin Dupratt
White, Is There an Eighteenth Amendment?, 6 VA. L. REG. 573, 574-81 (1920). White
quotes Joseph Story's COMMENTARIES and several Supreme Court opinions to the effect
that an amendment would be invalid if it destroyed the existence or sovereignty of the
Union or the several states.
41. Madison thought separation of powers was essential. See THE FEDERALIST No.
47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (asserting that "no political truth
is certainly of greater intrinsic value" than the separation of powers among the three
branches of government). See also infra Part II.C.3.
42. The events surrounding Parliament's amendment, including the subsequent
judicial challenge, are described in GRANVILLE AUSTIN, WORKING A DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION: A HISTORY OF THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE 370-90 (1999); Gary Jeffrey
Jacobsohn, An Unconstitutional Constitution: A Comparative Perspective, 4 INT'L J.
CONST. L. 460, 471-76 (2006). The Indian situation is very different from that of the
United States in that the amendments in question were adopted by Parliament and
directly prohibited the Court from reviewing certain actions of Parliament.
43. See His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati v. The State of Kerala, 1973 S.C.R. 1461.
According to the majority decision, the "basic structure" includes a republican and
democratic form of government, a secular and federal constitutional order, and the
separation of powers.
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both the existence of the "basic structure" doctrine and its ability to
prevent conflicting amendments from becoming effective."
Analytically, limiting the content of procedurally valid
constitutional amendments based on a basic structure or a core values
theory depends on the Constitution, or the regime it has established,
containing an identifiable nature or core, rather than it being a
collection of discrete propositions deriving authority from an act of
public will or consent. William Harris, a constitutional theorist, posits
that the possibility of such unconstitutional amendments depends
upon "the logic of the constitutional scheme."45  In his view, the
Constitution does have such a logic or "design" because in order to
"configure" a political arrangement that the community's members
will accept as binding, the Constitution cannot "speak like a fitfully
sleeping drunk, in disconnected words and phrases that act as free-
standing decrees. 4 6 Harris sees Article V as part of a larger whole
and reasons that the changes made using Article V "must continue to
make sense within the preexisting scheme of constitutional meaning."
He also argues that the idea of a coherent whole is implied by the
word "constitution" itself, since the constitution is what constitutes
the community governed by it in the strong sense of setting out the
community's identity rather than merely describing its discrete
characteristics." Of course, not all commentators would agree that
the American Constitution has a design or a core of fundamental
principles; and among those who do, some would characterize the
44. See Kesavananda Bharati , supra note 43. See Raju Ramachandran, The Supreme
Court and the Basic Structure Doctrine, in SUPREME BUT NOT INFALLIBLE: ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 107 (B.N. Kirpal, et al. eds., Oxford Univ.
Press 2000). The Court has used the basic structure doctrine to invalidate amendments in
several cases since Kesavananda Bharati. See Jacobsohn, supra note 42, at 474-76.
45. WILLIAM F. HARRIS II, THE INTERPRETABLE CONSTITUTION 169 (1993).
46. Id. at 13. Harris attributes the view that the Constitution reflects a "project,"
rather than a series of "sentences," to the Federalists. "The text was to be found in the
character of the project, not in its sentences." The Anti-Federalists, in contrast, saw the
document "in terms of provisions, not project." Id. at 171-72. Harris's own view is that
the constitutional system seems to contain both integrated provisions, reflecting a
distinctive character, and provisions not necessarily related to the core. Id. at 172 (noting
that "the settled persistence of the interpretive styles of both genres suggests that they
overlap in this constitutional order").
47. Id. at 183. The document's inner coherence is also presupposed by the idea that
the Constitution is "interpretable" without recourse to external truths. See id. at 14. An
"inherent tension" in the Constitution would not necessarily be inconsistent with the idea
of coherence, although an inherent contradiction would be. See infra notes 50, 106, 208-09
and accompanying text. Discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article.
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core exclusively in terms of procedural rather than substantive
principles."
The various theories of implicit substantive constraints discussed
in this section all take the peculiarly American system of
constitutional democracy as their starting point-that is, the positive
law of a specific regime. Additionally, it is possible to look more
broadly beyond the American system to essential features of the
generic idea of "constitutional democracy, 4 9 "all free governments, '"5'
"all democratic governments,"'" or republican government and use
these features to identify foundational elements of the American
regime that should be considered unamendable.
B. Historical Antecedents
The idea that certain aspects of the American Constitution are
foundational and permanent harkens back to the founding period.
Thomas Jefferson might be thought to have rejected this idea because
he proposed that a Constitutional Convention be held every nineteen
years to reassess the fitness of the Constitution for each new
generation. 2 In addition, he believed that the amending process was
a critical component of the constitutional design because it preserved
the ultimate authority of the people and because it provided a
mechanism for constitutional change in light of changing
circumstances. 3 Yet in the same letter that discusses the importance
of constitutional change, Jefferson also asserted that "[niothing then
48. See David Fontana, A Case for the Twenty-First Century Canon: Schneiderman v.
United States, 35 CONN. L. REV. 35, 42-53 (2002); see also infra notes 200-204 and
accompanying text.
49. See Murphy, Merlin's Memory, supra note 31, at 173-75. Muphy and others have
written about the inherent tension in this concept due to the fact that "democracy" and
"constitutionalism" frequently pull in different directions. See Walter F. Murphy, The Art
of Constitutional Interpretation: A Preliminary Showing, in ESSAYS ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 130, 133-34 (M. Judd Harmon, ed., Kennikat
Press 1978). See also Christopher L. Eisgruber, Justice and Text: Rethinking the
Constitutional Relation between Principle and Prudence, 43 DUKE L. J. 1 (1993) (arguing
that the tension between justice and constitutionality dissolves when constitutional norms
are interpreted in light of public opinions about justice).
50. See Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 662-63 (1874). See also infra
note 75.
51. See infra note 102.
52. See infra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 173, 176-77 and accompanying text.
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This statement suggests that his assertions about the importance of
keeping open the possibility of constitutional change should be
understood as qualified by his belief that certain aspects of the
American form of government were permanently binding.
Jefferson's writings also identify various substantive precepts
that he refers to as "obvious principles" of the Constitution or "true
principles."55 Some of these coincide with the inherent or inalienable
rights,56 while others appear to qualify as principles because they are
essential to the particular form of regime established by the
Constitution.57 For example, for Jefferson, the principle of the
separation of powers, although not expressly stated, was "clearly the
spirit of the Constitution" and an integral part of "free government"
more generally. This statement, together with his views about
popular sovereignty and the importance of the Article V amending
power, reveal his understanding that certain features of the regime
established by the Constitution were core elements of the regime's
basic character.
James Wilson, one of the drafters of the Constitution and
subsequently a Justice on the Supreme Court, is also well known for
emphasizing the power of the people to amend the Constitution. Yet
it is possible that, like Jefferson, he acknowledged constraints on this
power. After noting that "[a] majority of the society is sufficient for
[the purpose of amending the Constitution]," 8 Wilson added the
proviso that "if there be nothing in the change which can be
considered as contrary to the act of the original association, or to the
intention of those who united under it; all are bound to conform to
54. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Major John Cartwright (June 5, 1824), in 16 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 42, 47-48 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery
Bergh, eds. 1904) [hereinafter JEFFERSON, WRITINGS].
55. See infra note 187 and accompanying text; 28 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
508 (John Catanzariti ed., 2000).
56. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Jan. 22, 1797), in 9 JEFFERSON,
WRITINGS, supra note 54, at 367-68.
57. See infra notes 87, 88 and accompanying text.
58. Whether Wilson meant literally that a simple majority of the people could change
the Constitution has provoked a lively debate. See Henry Paul Monaghan, We the
People[s], Original Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV.
121, 153 (1996) (arguing that Wilson believed that the people's power to alter the
Constitution was adequately expressed in Article V); Amar, supra note 25 (arguing that
for Wilson, a majority of the people retained their ability to alter the Constitution by
means other than Article V). Amar appears not to have attached any importance to the
qualifications Wilson added, discussed in the text.
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the resolution of the majority."59 The proviso reveals his view that the
majority's amending power is limited by substantive constraints
implicit in the nature of the original compact and its animating
purposes.
Other writers are more clearly identified with the idea that the
Constitution contains core principles. In Calder v. Bull, for example,
Justice Chase derived limits on the powers of state legislatures from
"the nature and ends of legislative power," "the very nature of our
free Republican governments," and "the genius, the nature, and the
spirit of state government."'  Writing in the first half of the
nineteenth century, John C. Calhoun argued that a state would be
justified in seceding from the Union if an amendment to the
Constitution was passed that was not "fairly within the scope of the
amending power" because it would "radically change the character of
the constitution or the nature of the system."61 For Thomas Cooley, a
legal theorist writing at the end of the nineteenth century, for an
amendment to be valid, it "must be in harmony with the things
amended," by which he meant not inconsistent with "the democratic
principles that underlie our constitution."6 2 Cooley concluded from
this general principle that no amendment would be valid, even if
approved using Article V procedures, were it to create a nobility or a
monarchy. By the same token, a properly approved amendment
would be invalid if it sought to remove some states from the United
States or to tax some states differently than others.63
Debate about the existence of implied substantive limitations on
constitutional change arose several times in the first two decades of
the twentieth century as part of challenges to the constitutionality of
the Eighteenth (prohibition) and Nineteenth (woman's suffrage)
Amendments. Some of the opposition to the Eighteenth Amendment
was based on the precept that "the power to 'amend' the Constitution
was not intended to include the power to destroy it" or "to destroy
the states" by robbing them of their power to legislate in matters
59. 1 JAMES WILSON, THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 373, 375 (James Dewitt
Andrews ed., Callaghan & Co. 1896) [hereinafter WILSON, WORKS].
60. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798).
61. JOHN R. VILE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDING PROCESS IN AMERICAN
POLITICAL THOUGHT 86 (1992) (quoting 1 THE WORKS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 300, 301).
See also id. at 157. Calhoun was motivated in large part by the desire to protect the ability
of states to maintain the institution of slavery.
62. See id. at 158 (quoting Thomas M. Cooley, The Power to Amend the Federal




peculiarly within their provenance.6' These opponents also argued
that Article V was never intended to authorize constitutionalizing
"ordinary legislation."65  Others claimed that the amendment
interfered with the natural right of individuals to pursue happiness.
When it upheld the amendment against such attacks in the National
Prohibition Cases, the Supreme Court expressly noted that the
subject of the challenged amendment was within the Article V
amending power. 67 The Court's observation implies that properly
approved amendments could be unconstitutional based on their
content6 Two years later, in upholding the constitutionality of the
women's suffrage amendment, the Court addressed the plaintiffs'
argument that the Nineteenth Amendment was unconstitutional
"because of its character," 69 i.e., it would destroy the state's
''autonomy as a political body" by greatly increasing the size of the
electorate without its consent.0 The Court rejected this claim on the
grounds that the amendment was identical in "character" and
64. See id. at 159 (quoting from William L. Marbury, The Limitations Upon the
Amending Power, 33 HARV. L. REV. 223 (1919)). Marbury argued that states would cease
to exist as states if one by one their powers were removed by amendments to the
Constitution. See id. at 229. See also National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (1920)
(statement of Mr. McCran, for the State of New Jersey; statement of Mr. Levy Mayer and
Mr. Win. Marshall Bullitt). For a modem exponent of this view, see Mazzone, supra note 34.
65. See National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (statement of Mr. Root); see also
Marbury, supra note 64, at 229-30.
66. See Everett v. Abbott, Inalienable Rights and the Eighteenth Amendment, 20
COLUM. L. REV. 183, 185-87 (1920), cited in Scott Dodson, The Peculiar Federal Marriage
Amendment, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 783,785 n.8 (2004).
67. See National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. at 386.
68. See id. at 388 (White, CJ., concurring) (professing "profound[] regret" that the
majority opinion offered no reasons for its conclusions).
69. See Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 136 (1922).
70. William L. Marbury, The Nineteenth Amendment and After, 7 VA. L. REV. 1, 2-3,
28-29 (1920). Marbury did, however, believe that the people of the United States had the
power to authorize such amendments, but that an amendment would not be attributable to
the people unless Congress initiated the process by calling a national convention to
propose the amendments or the people approved amendments in conventions called for
this purpose in the states. See William L. Marbury, The Proposed Woman Suffrage
Amendment and the Amending Power, 65 U. PENN. L. REV. 403, 405-06 (1917). The
concern that small, but well organized, interest groups could force state legislatures to
adopt amendments not favored by the majority of a state's voters led to proposals,
introduced in both houses of Congress, to amend Article V to enable states to require that
amendments adopted by the legislatures be confirmed by a popular vote in that state. See
George Stewart Brown, The 'New Bill of Rights' Amendment, 9 VA. L. REV. 14, 14-15
(1922).
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"phraseology" with the Fifteenth Amendment, the provenance of
which had been unquestioned for fifty years."
These two cases are of limited precedential force because neither
discussed the idea of implicit substantive constraints, although both
appeared to take the possibility seriously. Moreover, because both
decisions upheld the amendments in question, there is no Supreme
Court precedent for invalidating an amendment due to its
incompatibility with existing constitutional provisions or principles.
Nevertheless, the Court has at times endorsed the view that certain
parts of the Constitution are "essential ... to [the federal
government's] very existence as a Government."72 For example, it
asserted its own authority to review decisions of state supreme courts
whenever the Constitution or federal law was at issue. The Court
reasoned that without this authority, disputes would likely be decided
by violence. 3 Since the Founders clearly intended the peaceful
resolution of such controversies, the Court concluded that it would
retain its power "so long.., as this Constitution shall endure. 7 4 This
statement implies that the Court views its power to resolve such cases
as inherent in the nature of the American system of government.
Thus, even if the requisite supermajorities adopted an amendment to
eliminate the Court's original or appellate power, an essential aspect
of the regime established by the Constitution could preclude its
enforcement.75
The thrust of these historical antecedents is that certain aspects
of the Constitution's design are inseparable from its existence. As
such, these antecedents lay the ground work for the thesis that, short
of revolution, there are implicit substantive constraints on the content
of constitutional change. The exact manner in which this conclusion
will affect the permanence of the religion clauses, however, remains
to be determined.
71. Leser, 258 U.S. at 136.
72. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506, 518 (1859).
73. Id. at 517.
74. Id. at 521. See also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (stating that "[tihe essence of our free Government is ...
to be governed by those impersonal forces which we call law"); Madisonville Traction Co.
v. St. Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1904) (relying upon fundamental
principles that "grow[] out of the essential nature of all free governments.").
75. For other judicial examples, see supra notes 21, 28-36.
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C. Identifying Implicit Substantive Limits on Constitutional Change
The premise that core foundational elements of the American
Constitution can be inconsistent with certain constitutional
amendments will lack practical import unless there exists a
reasonably reliable way to identify them. Thus, in order to evaluate
the plausibility of such constraints, it is necessary to examine more
closely the types of "core values" or "basic structure" that are
sufficiently well-defined to serve as substantive constraints on
constitutional change.
1. The Declaration of Independence as a Source of Fundamental
Values
Courts and commentators often turn to the Declaration of
Independence as a source of fundamental American values. The
second paragraph states that "all men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among
these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. ' ,76 The Supreme
Court has turned to the quoted clauses or the Declaration more
generally when seeking to uphold rights as varied as the right to
marry,77 the right to pursue a profession,8 the right of parents to
control the education of their children,79 and the right of illegitimate
children to social security benefits.' Similarly, commentators have
argued that the Declaration is our real Constitution,8" and that the
76. This is from the famous paragraph beginning "We hold these truths to be self-
evident .... " See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 2 (1776). The expression
was "sacred and undeniable" in one of Jefferson's early drafts, but was changed in
subsequent drafts, possibly by Jefferson. See JOHN H. HAZELTON, THE DECLARATION
OF INDEPENDENCE: ITS HISTORY 596-97 (1970).
77. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (connecting the right to marry with
the "pursuit of happiness").
78. See Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277 (1867) (invalidating state law requiring
applicants for a license to preach to swear they had never taken up arms against the
United States or come to the aid or comfort of those who had). The Court asserted that
"the theory upon which our political institutions rest is that all men have certain
inalienable rights." Id. at 321.
79. See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925). See also Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (entitling parents to "make decisions concerning the care,
custody, and control of their children.").
80. See Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
81. Jack M. Balkin, The Declaration and the Promise of a Democratic Culture, 4
WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 167, 168 (1999). See also Walter F. Murphy, The Right to Privacy
and Legitimate Constitutional Change, in THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASES OF SOCIAL AND
POLITICAL CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES (Shlomo Slonin, ed., Praeger Publishers
1990); Paolo Torzilli, Rectifying the Sanctity of Human Life, 40 CATH. LAW. 197, 224
(2000).
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Constitution was originally seen as "the national legal
implementation of the legal philosophy proclaimed in the
Declaration .... "8' An extreme variant of this interpretation is that
the Declaration, and not the Constitution, is the only unalterable
aspect of American law because the Declaration states the ends of
government, whereas the Constitution merely outlines the means to
achieve those ends. 3 According to this understanding, the rights
stated in the Declaration (including the right of revolution) should be
the touchstone for determining what laws-whether statutes or
constitutional amendments-are entitled to take effect. Everything
else is negotiable and, thus, subject to amendment.
The rights enumerated in the Declaration have often been
construed as "natural rights" in the sense of transcendent standards
or "higher law." 8 If they are understood in this manner, the regime
established by the Constitution would point outside itself to external
standards of indeterminate scope. Even if those standards were not
derived from revealed religion, i.e., if they could be fashioned from a
secular understanding of human nature or civilized society,85 it would
be virtually impossible to define the universe of fundamental
principles with enough precision to make an implicit substantive
constraint approach to constitutional change workable.
Yet the rights announced in the Declaration need not be
understood as transcendent. These rights, and indeed any
fundamental principles considered an integral part of the
constitutional scheme, could be viewed as the product of positive law,
i.e., the organizing documents of the American regime. In support of
this view is a letter written in 1800 by Thomas Jefferson referring to
the "obvious principles" of the Constitution, which Jefferson
identifies as states' rights, freedom of religion, freedom of the press,
82. Edward J. Melvin, The Constitution and the Declaration of Independence: Natural
Law in American History, 31 CATH. LAw. 35, 36 (1987). See also Lewis Lehrman, On
Jaffa, Lincoln, Marshall, and Original Intent, 10 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 343, 345 (1987)
(asserting, based upon statements of Abraham Lincoln, that the "principles" of the
Declaration "are manifestly what the Framers meant to implement").
83. See Dan Himmelfarb, The Constitutional Relevance of the Second Sentence of the
Declaration of Independence, 100 YALE L.J. 169, 174 (1990).
84. See Clarence Thomas, The Higher Law Background of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 63, 64
(1989).
85. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 278-79 (1985) (identifying "these guarantees
of liberty" with "the rights possessed by every individual in a civilized society...").
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trial by jury, and economical government. 8' Two decades later, he
also mentioned the writ of habeas corpus and the exclusive right of
the people's representatives to determine legislation and taxation as
among the "principles in which all our constitutions agree."'' Both of
these enumerations indicate that Jefferson viewed the inalienable
rights as inalienable in America, but not necessarily inalienable
simply. In other words, the inalienable rights would be established by
positive rather than natural law.
What, then, to make of the "self-evidence" attributed to the
rights enumerated in the Declaration of Independence? One
commentator has noted that the sentence begins "We hold these
truths to be self-evident," rather than a declaration that they are self-
evident simply.88 The "We" is the American people or those of them
who endorsed the revolution against Great Britain. "Hold" refers to
the fact that we take these to be true in the sense of axioms for our
political community.89 This interpretation, which portrays the rights
as reflecting positive law, gains support from the statement of the
Supreme Court that "the theory upon which our political institutions
rest is, that all men have certain inalienable rights."9 They rest, in
other words, on a "theory" rather than on eternal verities, and it is
''our institutions" rather than democracies or governments that are
thus dependent. Treating the Declaration's inalienable rights as an
expression of positive law is also consistent with other decisions
linking fundamental principles to American political institutions 9' or
"the traditions and conscience" of the American people.
92
Even if the rights in the Declaration are statements of positive
law, using them as the measuring rod against which to evaluate the
constitutionality of Article V amendments is troublesome for several
reasons. First, it is questionable whether, or to what extent, it is
correct to assume that the Constitution embodies the principles
86. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gideon Granger (Aug. 13, 1800), in 10
JEFFERSON, WRITINGS, supra note 54, at 166-67.
87. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to A. Coray (Oct. 31, 1823), in 15 JEFFERSON,
WRITINGS, supra note 54, at 489. "All of our constitutions" appears to mean all of the
constitutions of the individual states of the United States.
88. Michael P. Zuckert, Self-Evident Truths and the Declaration of Independence, 49
REV. POL. 319, 323-24 (1987).
89. See id. The reference to the Creator as the source of the rights is also preceded by
the phrase "We hold."
90. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277, 321 (1866).
91. See Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316-17 (1926).
92. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285 (1935) (quoting Synder v. Massachusetts,
291 U.S. 97, 105 (1935)).
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enunciated in the Declaration. The Constitution does not explicitly
refer to either the Declaration or its statement of rights. The
language of the Preamble to the Constitution, where one might
expect reference to the Declaration or its values, does not track the
language of the earlier document and lacks any reference to rights.93
The Preamble is almost exclusively concerned with the collective
aspects of the community. 94 Although liberty is mentioned as the last
of the purposes for forming the union in the Preamble, the reference
is to the "blessings" of liberty, rather than the Declaration's "right" to
liberty. Moreover, the debates during the drafting of the Constitution
contain only one direct mention of the Declaration, and the issue
under discussion on that occasion was the character of the relation of
the states to one another after the break from Great Britain was
announced. 95 Similarly, the Declaration is referred to by name only
once in the Federalist Papers.96
One interpretation of these omissions is that it was "taken for
granted" that the Declaration was the foundation of the Constitution,
to the point where its importance did not need to be asserted. 97
Pointing in the opposite direction is the fact that Supreme Court
decisions before the Civil War referred to the Declaration exclusively
as a document marking the beginning of a republic independent of
Great Britain, at which time the law of each state was the governing
law in that jurisdiction. 98 When the statement of rights in the
93. The Preamble is not inconsistent with the Declaration. Rather, the relationship
between the two is simply not made explicit.
94. See U.S. CONST. pmbl.
95. See NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 REPORTED BY
JAMES MADISON 153 (James Wilson asserting that the states became independent from
Great Britain but were "confederated" with each other, as contrasted with being "in a
state of nature toward one another," as was the view of Luther Martin, a delegate from
Maryland). See also Edward J. Erler, The Political Philosophy of the Constitution, in TO
FORM A MORE PERFECT UNION: THE CRITICAL IDEAS OF THE CONSTITUTION 134, 152-
53 (Herman Belz, Ronald Hoffman, & Peter J. Albert, eds. 1992) (describing the
background of the interchange between Wilson and Martin).
96. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 41, No. 40, at 253 (James Madison) (citing the
people's right to alter or abolish their government to "secure their safety and happiness").
The Declaration is clearly referenced, however, without being named, in at least one other
place. See Erler, supra note 95, at 162 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James
Madison)).
97. See Erler, supra note 95, at 153.
98. See, e.g., Inglis v. Sailor's Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. 99, 121-22 (1830); M'ilvaine v.
Coxe's Lessee, 6 U.S. 280, 294 (1804); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199, 224-25 (1796). See also
Camp v. Lockwood, 1 U.S. (3 Dall.) 393, 402-03 (Ct. Com. P1. Philadelphia Co. 1788).
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Declaration was quoted during the nineteenth century, it was almost
always in the briefs of counsel or relied upon in dissenting opinions.99
The historian Philip Detweiler has noted several other obstacles
to assuming that the Constitution embodies, or was understood as
embodying, the principles enunciated in the Declaration of
Independence. He observes that the discussions at the state
conventions ratifying the Constitution "rarely invoked Jefferson's
language of 1776. ' m° He also found that speeches during Fourth of
July celebrations in the 1780s failed to mention the political theory of
rights and that the state constitutions patterned themselves after the
Virginia Declaration of Rights rather than the statement of rights in
the Declaration. From these observations, Detweiler concludes that
the significance of the Declaration evolved slowly between the 1790s
and the 1820s from its justification for the break with Great Britain to
the statement of principles for which it is famous today.
Another barrier to relying upon the Declaration for a statement
of constitutional principles is that the rights enumerated in the
Declaration are pronounced in a general and abstract fashion. The
history of constitutional law is in significant part an attempt to
identify what those and similar open-ended norms entail when
legislation is challenged as violating such constitutional provisions.
As a consequence, it would be predictably difficult and arguably
dangerous for the Supreme Court to invalidate a properly ratified
amendment based upon a contested interpretation of a vague
standard. Although it is true that resolving interpretative ambiguities
is quintessentially the work of the Court,'O° overturning amendments
would not be comparable to overturning statutes. Among other
things, when the Court invalidates a statute on constitutional grounds,
it is still possible to "overturn" the Court's ruling with a constitutional
amendment. 2 Thus, in criticizing the idea of implicit substantive
99. See, e.g., Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 159-60 (1896); Ex
parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 365-66 (1879) (Field, J., dissenting).
100. See Philip F. Detweiler, The Changing Reputation of the Declaration of
Independence: The First Fifty Years, 19 WM. & MARY Q. 557, 559-63 (1962).
101. See Tribe, supra note 30, at 440-41.
102. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. Other examples include the Fourteenth
Amendment, which overturned Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) and the Twenty-
Sixth Amendment overturning Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). According to one
author, the Twenty-Third and Twenty-Fourth Amendments (poll taxes) were enacted, at
least in part, in response to Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See DAVID E.
KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, 1776-
1995, 349-57 (1996). The Twenty-Fourth Amendment, proposed in 1962, and ratified in
1964, prohibited poll taxes and thus overruled Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937).
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limits on constitutional amendments, some commentators have
expressed doubts about the Court having the power to invalidate
amendments based upon their content because numerous
amendments after the first ten have been proposed specifically to
overturn controversial Supreme Court decisions. 3
2. Other Sources of Fundamental Values
Proponents of the idea of implicit substantive constraints who do
not emphasize the Declaration of Independence have characterized
the core principles or values of the American regime in a variety of
ways. The overarching principle uniting all of these characterizations
is the idea of coherence or fit.1°4 As expressed by Laurence Tribe:
The Constitution does provide guidance of a sort-not decisive,
but suggestive-for assessing the appropriateness of proposed
amendments. Far from being a mere assortment of
unconnected rules and standards, the Constitution can surely be
understood as unified, although not rendered wholly coherent,
by certain underlying political ideals: representative
republicanism, federalism, separation of powers, equality
before the law, individual autonomy, and procedural fairness.
We may choose to reject some or all of these ideals, to override
them, or to recast them, but as long as we retain some
commitment to the Constitution-as long as we are amending it
instead of discarding it-we cannot simply ignore its
fundamental norms.
In short, Tribe's position is that the Constitution embodies
certain fundamental values such that amendments contradicting those
values would amount to regime change or revolution, rather than
amendment. If Article V creates a procedure for amendment, but not
revolution, then "amendments" that do more than amend would not
be legitimate under Article V. This distinction, which amounts to the
difference between improving or refining the existing form of
government on the one hand and "regime change" on the other, has
103. See Tribe, supra note 30, at 442; Fritz W. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political
Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517, 589 (1966). See also David E. Kyvig,
Appealing Supreme Court Decisions: Constitutional Amendments As Checks on Judicial
Review, 2 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 106 (1996).
104. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
105. Tribe, supra note 30, at 439-40 (footnotes omitted).
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also been espoused by other theorists as a limitation on the content of
valid amendments. 1°6
Numerous other candidates for specific values that are
fundamental for the American constitutional project have been
proposed. Human dignity has been suggested as a core value, ° as
have political participation, privacy," tolerance,
1 0  autonomy,'
freedom,"' equality,"3 and the entire First Amendment. 4  It is not
difficult to find authoritative sources supporting the centrality of
religious freedom for the American Constitution. In proposing to
include freedom of conscience in the country's bill of rights, Madison
106. See Mazzone, supra note 34, at 1752 (asserting that "[m]odifications that are more
than amendments.., require higher lawmaking"); id. at 1828-31 (attributing this view to
George Washington), Id. at 1831-32; Murphy, Ordering of Constitutional Values, supra
note 31, at 755-57; SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS 43 (1984);
HARRIS, supra note 45, at 190.
107. See HARRIS, supra note 45, at 97-98 (describing dignity and democracy as "meta"
constitutional values); Murphy, Ordering of Constitutional Values, supra note 31, at 708
(asserting that the fundamental value in the Constitution today is human dignity and
suggesting that the judiciary take this "fixed star" into account in reaching its
determinations); Murphy, Art of Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 49, at 156
(arguing the fundamental value has become human dignity, which he believes suggests this
was not the fundamental principle at the founding). See also Aharon Barak, Forward: A
Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 39
(2002) (arguing that respecting human dignity is fundamental to all democratic
governments).
108. See Walter F. Murphy, Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and Democracy, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: TRANSITIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY
WORLD 13 (Greenberg, Katz, Olivero, & Wheatley eds., 1993); Murphy, Merlin's
Memory, supra note 31, at 179; ELY, supra note 34, at ch. 4.
109. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (arguing that the right to privacy
can be found in the penumbras and emanations of other rights, the Ninth Amendment's
reservation of rights to the people, and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause). See also Murphy, Right to Privacy, supra note 81.
110. Barak, supra note 107, at 39 (referring to constitutional democracies in general).
111. Murphy, Merlin's Memory, supra note 31, at 190.
112. Id. at 179.
113. See Clarence Thomas, Toward a Plain Reading of the Constitution-The
Declaration of Independence in Constitutional Interpretation, 30 HOw. L.J. 983 (1987)
(arguing that equality is the primary constitutional value). Perhaps property should be
added. According to John Murrin, Jefferson probably viewed "property as a very basic
civil right, defined by government, but not anterior to it." John M. Murrin, Fundamental
Values, the Founding Fathers, and the Constitution, in TO FORM A MORE PERFECT
UNION: THE CRITICAL IDEAS OF THE CONSTITUTION 1, 21-22 (Herman Belz, Ronald
Hoffman, & Peter J. Albert eds., 1992). Jefferson's reservations about property as a
natural right, see id. at 21, may be the reason he omitted it in the enumeration of rights
contained in the Declaration of Independence, despite the document's obvious Lockean
provenance.
114. Murphy, Art of Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 49, at 151.
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called religious freedom one of "the great rights" and "choicest
privileges of the people," "a fundamental and undeniable truth,"."5
and "[almong the features peculiar to the Political system" of the
United States."6 As was noted earlier, Jefferson also singled out
religious freedom as one of the "obvious principles" of the American
Constitution."7
3. The Regime's Basic Structure as a Source of Implicit Constraints
Fundamental values can also be derived from the basic structure
of the country's institutional arrangement."' A basic structure
analysis might well include core or fundamental values such as those
mentioned in the previous section on the ground that they are
essential to a constitutional democracy such as ours. A basic
structure approach could, however, extend further. For example,
suppose a properly ratified amendment sought to eliminate the
Article V amendment procedure entirely in the hopes of entrenching
the Constitution in its present form permanently. Although nothing
in the text of the Constitution prohibits this, this hypothetical
amendment could interfere with an essential aspect of the basic
structure of the document and the regime it established-namely,
creating a mechanism for altering certain aspects of the regime
without resort to violence or revolutionary measures." 9  The
115. The first two phrases are from a speech Madison gave in the House of
Representatives in 1789. See 5 MADISON, WRITINGS, THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 380 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910) [hereinafter MADISON, WRITINGS]. Madison
listed freedom of the press and trial by jury in criminal cases as the two other great rights.
The third phrase is from the Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments.
Id. at 184.
116. Letter from James Madison to Jacob de la Motta (August 1820), in 9 MADISON,
WRITINGS, supra note 115, at 29-30. This letter focuses on the "perfect equality of rights"
available to all religious sects because it was written in reply to a letter describing the
situation of a Jewish synagogue in Savannah, Georgia. It also references the equal
religious rights of individuals, regardless of sect, because of the policy's contribution to
"social harmony" and "the advancement of truth." Id. at 30. What we consider
fundamental today in the area of religion may be different from what was considered
fundamental at the time of the Founding, since the First Amendment initially applied only
to the national government. When the Constitution was ratified, several states had an
established church. See MARK DOUGLAS MCGARVIE, ONE NATION UNDER LAW:
AMERICA'S EARLY NATIONAL STRUGGLE TO SEPARATE CHURCH AND STATE 16-20
(2005).
117. See supra note 87.
118. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
119. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 42, NO. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton);
Walter Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: Rethinking the Amendment
Process, 97 HARV. L. REV. 386, 431 (1983) (arguing that "article V represents a
domestication of the right to revolution"); See also supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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amendment seeking to eliminate Article V might also be invalidated
as inconsistent with even a weak notion of republicanism or popular
sovereignty, since the elimination of Article V would enable
generations prior to the amendment to deny subsequent generations
the ability to govern themselves in all matters made unamendable by
virtue of having been part of the Constitution at the time Article V
was removed."'
Alternatively, an amendment to Article V authorizing Congress
to amend the Constitution, with or without supermajority votes in
both houses, without submitting its proposal to state legislatures or
conventions for ratification might not withstand a basic structure
analysis. This hypothetical amendment would, in effect, place an
overwhelming share of power in the hands of the legislative branch,
by enabling it to amend the Constitution without recourse to the
people in the several states. Additionally, this truncated mechanism
could overturn judicial decisions and could also interfere with the
balance of powers held by individuals, the states, and the national
government."' Thus, the hypothetical amendment could be construed
as antithetical to the regime's basic structure by precluding any route
to achieving a balance of powers.'22 Although one wonders how
Akhil Amar considers the Article V mechanism so fundamental that he argues that it
would be unconstitutional to adopt an amendment eliminating the First Amendment since
the consequence would be to destroy the conditions necessary for further constitutional
revision. See Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution
Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043, 1045 n.1 (1988). See also Murphy, Art of
Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 49. For the opposite view, see Douglas Linder,
What in the Constitution Cannot Be Amended?, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 722-27 (1981).
120. Later generations could, of course, undertake revolutionary change by replacing
the existing constitution with a new constitution. For a view contrary to the one expressed
in the text, see RICHARD B. BERNSTEIN, AMENDING AMERICA: IF WE LOVE THE
CONSTITUTION SO MUCH, WHY Do WE KEEP TRYING TO CHANGE IT? 255 (1993)
(arguing that, not only could the Article V process be eliminated by an amendment, but
the entrenched equal representation provision could be eliminated as well).
121. Although the principle of the separation of powers appears to be derivative of the
more general principle of checks and balances between and among possessors of power in
the U.S. government, it is difficult to imagine a balance of power structure without some
variant of this feature. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 174
(1801) (criticizing the tendency of the Virginia constitution to repose the legislative,
judicial, and executive power in the legislative on the grounds that the result would be an
"elective despotism").
122. However, such an amendment would not be inconsistent with the Tenth
Amendment since the Tenth Amendment defines the rights of the people and the states as
residual to the powers granted to the national government. The Tenth Amendment states:
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the States, respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST.
amend. X.
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enough people in three-fourths of the states could be persuaded to
adopt such an amendment in the first place,'23 the Prohibition
Amendment teaches that the good sense of a very large part of the
population can be suspended at one time.
Finally, considerations of the basic structure might also call into
question amendments that constitutionalize "highly specific" and
"controversial" public policy choices, like balancing the budget, flag
burning, or banning handguns, because the nature of the constitution
adopted in the United States is to "serve both as a blueprint for
government operations and as an authoritative statement of the
nation's most important and enduring values.' ' 124 Measures that look
more like public policy rather than fundamental values should, on this
theory, be precluded by the meaning of what a "constitution"
constitutes.'25
In short, either a fundamental values approach or a basic
structure approach can, in principle, afford a conceptual basis from
which to develop an account of the bedrock features of the American
regime that could restrict the content of validly adopted amendments.
The two frameworks might not, however, generate an identical list of
core values. For example, principles derived from a basic structure
analysis would surely include "rights of communication," but would
not necessarily include "religious freedom.' ' 26 Taking both sources of
implicit substantive constraints together would probably best capture
the spirit of the American Constitution. By the same token, it would
make the analysis identifying the content of such constraints more
difficult, not the least because the two sources would at times make
competing, even inconsistent, claims as to which principles are core
and which derivative or instrumental.
127
In the United States, the laws of several states provide a partial
model for distinguishing amendments that alter a fundamental aspect
of a constitution from those that alter the document without
disrupting its core or foundational elements. The constitutions of
these states distinguish between constitutional revision and
123. For an alternative that would bypass the need for approval by states, see Amar,
supra note 25.
124. See Tribe, supra note 30, at 441-42.
125. See Murphy, Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and Democracy, supra note 108, at
7-10.
126. See Murphy, Ordering of Constitutional Values, supra note 31, at 713.
127. It is beyond the scope of this article to articulate, much less resolve this issue. For
attempts to do just that, see Murphy, Ordering of Constitutional Values, supra note 31;
Murphy, Art of Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 49, at 147-55.
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constitutional amendment, with "revision" referring to fundamental
change and "amendment" to changes that do not affect the
constitution's core.'28 The purpose of marking this difference in these
state constitutions is procedural. "Revisions" to state constitutions
require a more complicated process to become effective than do
"amendments" because revisions by definition trigger fundamental
change.'29 The threshold question of deciding whether a proposed
change is so fundamental as to constitute a revision rather than an
amendment (in the state law sense) is itself fraught with difficulty at
the state level. 30 Thus, the threshold classification question has
repeatedly been litigated in state courts.' As a consequence, the
controversies provoked by the revision-amendment distinction could
provide useful insights into the problems likely to arise if the
distinction were to be incorporated at the federal level.
128. See Michael G. Colantuono, The Revision of American State Constitutions:
Legislative Power, Popular Sovereignty, and Constitutional Change, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1473
(1987). In some states, a constitution is revised if multiple subjects are amended, even if
the consequence falls short of changing the basic character of the constitution. The
Supreme Court of Delaware has rejected this kind of quantitative determination. See
Opinion of the Justices of the Supreme Court in Response to a Question Propounded by the
Governor of Delaware, 264 A.2d 342 (Del. 1970) [hereinafter Opinion of the Justices].
Some countries have constitutions that distinguish between ordinary amendments
and constitutional revision, or between amendment, partial revision, and total revision.
See, e.g., CONSTITUCION [C.E.] art. 168 (Spain); Elai Katz, On Amending Constitutions:
The Legality and Legitimacy of Constitutional Entrenchment, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
PROBS. 251, 284 (1996).
129. See Colantuono, supra note 128, at 1479; Opinion of the Justices, supra note 128.
130. For a discussion of the difficulty in distinguishing more and less fundamental
changes, see Sanford Levinson, How Many Times Has the United States Constitution Been
Amended? (A) <26; (B) 26; (C) 27; (D) >27: Accounting for Constitutional Change, in
RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION, supra note 31, at 13, 18-20.
131. See Bess v. Ulmer, 985 P.2d 979, 987-89 (Alaska 2000); Raven v. Deukmejian, 52
Cal.3d 336, 349-55 (Cal. 1990); Strauss v. Horten, 207 P.3d 48, 60-63 (Cal. 2009); Cambria
v. Soaries, 776 A.2d 754 ( N.J. 2000).
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D. From Theory to Practice
Thus, although contested by some, 32 there are both historical and
theoretical arguments for the proposition that implicit substantive
constraints exist limiting the validity of properly adopted
amendments to the Constitution.'33 By itself, however, this conclusion
leaves unanswered the practical question of who, or what body,
should decide which existing constitutional provisions are so
fundamental that they should act as substantive constraints on further
amendments and when the constraints apply. The courts and
Congress are the two obvious alternatives, and both pose challenging
institutional difficulties.
Some who endorse the possibility of implicit substantive
constraints on amendments would trust the determination to
Congress on the grounds that a determination of this kind would be a
political question of the type historically reserved for the legislative
branch. Writing in the 1940s, constitutional historian Lester Orfield
argued that the Supreme Court generally viewed questions relating to
the amendment process as political.3  More recently, Laurence Tribe
addressed the specific question of implicit substantive constraints on
132. See, e.g., Thomas E. Baker, Towards a "More Perfect Union": Some Thoughts on
Amending the Constitution, 10 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 1, 6-7 (2000) (declaring that the
Supreme Court has dismissed the idea); Walter Dellinger, Constitutional Politics: A
Rejoinder, 97 HARV. L. REV. 446, 448 n.14 (1983) (arguing that "it would seem impossible
to infer an intention that any other restrictions were intended to be placed on the
character of amendments that might be adopted"); Linder, supra note 119, at 731-33;
Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The Constitutional Lessons of the
Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 677, 693 (1993) ("The provisions of a legal
text may be taken as standing for a more general principle only to the extent that the text
so provides. It is the rule provided for in the text, not the 'principle' for which the rule is
thought to stand, that is law."); Vile, The Case Against Implicit Limits, supra note 31, at
191. Although they do not discuss the question directly, many interpretivists and
originalists would reject the notion of implicit substantive constraints as a corollary to
their rejection of applying underlying principles directly to cases and controversies. See,
e.g., Randy Barnett, Underlying Principles, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 405 (2007).
133. For authorities that support the possibility of implicit substantive constraints, see
Amar, supra note 119; Marty Haddad, Substantive Content of Constitutional Amendments:
Political Question or Justiciable Concern?, 42 WAYNE L. REV. 1685 (1996); William L.
Marbury, The Limitations Upon the Amending Power, 33 HARV. L. REV. 223 (1919);
Murphy, An Ordering of Constitutional Values, supra note 31, at 755-57; Jeffrey Rosen,
Was the Flag Burning Amendment Unconstitutional?, 100 YALE L.J. 1073, 1073 (1990);
Joan Schaffner, The Federal Marriage Amendment: To Protect the Sanctity of Marriage or
Destroy Constitutional Democracy?, 55 AM. U.L. REV. 1487, 1494-96 (2005); Tribe, supra
note 30, at 438-42. See also Mazzone, supra note 34.
134. See LESTER BERNHARDT ORFIELD, THE AMENDING OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 22-27 (1942) (summarizing judicial decisions in the early part of the
twentieth century).
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amendments and concluded that a substantive evaluation of an
amendment's fit with core constitutional norms would constitute a
"true political question." 3 ' By "political" these authors appear to
mean that the determination must be made by the institution making
the most credible claim to represent the will of the people; they do
not suggest that the judiciary would be unable to make a
determination based upon the text of the Constitution and its
underlying principles. 36
The political nature of such determinations is, however, a
double-edged sword. Granting this authority to Congress is
questionable in the first instance because it is likely that the two
houses of Congress will have initiated the amendment process and
subsequently ratified the proposed amendment by supermajority
votes. 37 Thus, allowing Congress to determine whether implicit
substantive constraints apply would fail any test for disinterestedness
or impartial, considered judgment. Walter Dellinger rejects allowing
Congress to decide. In his view, when controversies have arisen
concerning the procedural requirements of Article V, "congressional
authority is... dysfunctional and responsible for much of the
uncertainty surrounding the amendment process. '  Since assessing
the counterpart question of implicit substantive limitations would be
considerably more complex than assessing compliance with
procedural standards, residing this power in Congress would, for
Dellinger, be correspondingly more questionable.
Alternatively, granting this power to the judiciary could lead to
equally undesirable consequences. Numerous amendments have
been proposed to overturn Supreme Court decisions. '39 This fact
should caution against ceding to the judiciary the exclusive power to
determine if an amendment is compatible with the existing
Constitution. Further, as the preceding discussion has made clear,
relying on the Court to apply implicit substantive constraints to
135. See Tribe, supra note 30, at 433.
136. See John Ferejohn, The Politics of Imperfection: The Amendments of
Constitutions, 22 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 501 (1997) (arguing that a decision is political
when it is not derived from transcendent premises and must instead be a product of
choice).
137. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
138. Dellinger, supra note 119, at 405. Dellinger also notes that there is no textual
authority for and considerable judicial precedent against Congress assuming this
responsibility. Id. Dellinger denies the legitimacy of implicit substantive constraints in
any event. Walker Dellinger, Constitutional Politics: A Rejoinder, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 446,
447-48 (1983).
139. See supra notes 6, 103, and accompanying text.
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protect core constitutional values would risk undermining the
credibility of the judiciary. Not only is the existence of such
constraints contested; identifying which values are core and
discerning when these values are threatened would be among the
most elusive tasks a court could confront. It is difficult to imagine any
court ruling that would enrage the nation to a greater degree since, by
hypothesis, satisfaction of the two supermajority requirements of
Article V would already have revealed the existence of a wide-
ranging national consensus in support of the amendment.
The "life begins at conception" amendment illustrates these
points well. Imagine that a large enough portion of Americans
desired such an amendment to succeed and adopted it in accordance
with Article V. The predictable ferocity of the public's reaction, were
the Supreme Court to invalidate the amendment based upon implicit
substantive standards, would likely severely compromise the Court's
authority.4 °
In addition to these difficulties, to repose the power to invalidate
an Article V amendment in either the judiciary or the legislature
could well "upset the delicate balance" between these two
institutions, '41 threatening the effectiveness of the American regime's
structure of checks and balances. Thus, although these institutional
barriers do not rule out adopting the implicit substantive constraint
doctrine, they do suggest both the need for caution in pursuing it and
the desirability of considering alternative strategies for protecting the
religious clauses of the First Amendment. An alternative strategy is
the subject of the next Part.
II. Constitutional Entrenchment
A possible alternative to the strategy discussed in Part I would be
to persuade a sufficient number of concerned citizens to sponsor an
amendment (or multiple amendments) that would make the
constitutional values at risk permanent by explicitly identifying them
140. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and
Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 373, 374 (2007). Faced with these two unappealing
alternatives, some commentators have suggested that amendments that would alter
fundamental values of the existing Constitution should be adopted through the convention
method at both stages. See Katz, supra note 128, at 287-88; Mazzone, supra note 34;
Schaffner, supra note 133, at 1497-1501. However, Article V offers no support for routing
any subset of amendments through a specific track among the four possibilities offered.
See Schaffner, supra note 133, at 1505.
141. See Ferejohn, supra note 136.
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and designating them unamendable. This type of amendment can be
called an "entrenching amendment."
A. The Idea of Constitutional Entrenchment
The phrase "constitutional entrenchment" has been employed to
refer to the act of placing legislative or common law precepts in a
constitution or in special legislation classified as "basic law" so that
the precepts are more difficult to repeal.' This phrase can also be
used to describe the act of placing features of a country's
constitutional or basic law beyond amendment. The latter meaning
of "constitutional entrenchment" is explored in this Part.'
43
Initially, three provisions were entrenched in the U.S.
Constitution: a prohibition against interfering with a state's ability to
authorize the importation or migration of slaves, a prohibition against
imposing direct taxes other than taxes proportionate to the
population, and a prohibition against denying a state equal
representation in the Senate without its consent.'" By the express
terms of Article V, the first two provisions expired in 1808 .1' At the
present time, only the provision protecting states from losing their
142. See Ron Hirschl, Israel's 'Constitutional Revolution': The Legal Interpretation of
Entrenched Civil Liberties in an Emerging Neo-Liberal Economic Order, 46 AM. J. COMP.
LAW 427, 451 (1998) (referring to the enactment of a Basic Law in 1992 as a constitutional
entrenchment of the civil rights guaranteed by the Basic Law); Michael Kirby,
International Law-The Impact on National Constitutions, 21 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 327, 336
(2006) (referring to constitutional provisions protecting rights as entrenching the rights);
Gidon Sapir, Religion and State in Israel: The Case for Reevaluation and Constitutional
Entrenchment, 22 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP L. REV. 617 (1999) (arguing that there should
be an open debate on the subject of the relation between religion and state in Israel and
that the results should be afforded constitutional status so that they clearly outrank
ordinary legislation). See also Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative
Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE L.J. 1665, 1667 (2002) (using "entrenchment" to
describe laws or rules one legislature enacts that preclude repeal or amendment by a
subsequent legislature using the same procedure used to enact the precepts in the first
place).
143. A third possible meaning equates entrenchment with the strategy described in
Part I, i.e., finding limits on the types of possible amendments through implicit substantive
constraints. See Ferejohn, supra note 136 (equating implicit substantive constraints with
entrenchment).
144. U.S. CONST. art. V (which references art. I, § 9, cls. 1, 4). Roger Sherman had
proposed an additional entrenched provision, i.e., that the states' police power should be
exclusive over matters affecting the internal affairs of the state. See Carlos E. Gonzalez,
Popular Sovereign Generated Versus Government Institution Generated Constitutional
Norms: When Does a Constitutional Amendment Not Amend the Constitution?, 80 WASH.
U.L.Q. 127, 189 (2002). See also Vile, supra note 31, at 192 (describing the discussion of
Article V at the Philadelphia Convention, including Madison's fear that further additions
to the list of entrenched provisions would open the "floodgates" to "special provisos").
145. U.S. CONST. art. V.
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equal representation in the Senate without their consent is expressly
entrenched.
Constitutions of numerous countries contain such entrenched
provisions. The most frequently cited example is Germany, which
adopted a constitution after World War II providing that certain
human rights may not be removed by amending the constitution, even
if such an amendment is adopted with the supermajorities required in
the case of ordinary amendments. 6 The constitutions of Turkey and
Namibia similarly place certain rights beyond amendment. 14 7 The
constitution of Nepal prohibits amendments that are contrary to "the
spirit of the Preamble., 148 The constitutions of Afghanistan, France,
and Turkey entrench the "republican form of government.' ' 149  The
constitutions of Mozambique and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania
both provide that presidential term limits cannot be amended.5 In
Bahrain, the constitution entrenches several provisions, including
Shari'a as a main source for legislation, the principle of inherited rule,
a bicameral system, and the principles of freedom and equality."'
146. See BASIC LAW OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, art. 79(3), in 7
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 35 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert
H. Flanz eds., 2007) (hereinafter CONSTITUTIONS). For a discussion of German, French,
and Indian constitutional entrenchment, see Katz, supra note 128, at 265-73. See also
Mazzone, supra note 34, at 1827 n.400 (describing entrenchment provisions in the
constitutions of France, Italy, Norway, Romania, and the Ukraine).
147. See CONSTITUTION OF NAMIBIA, ch. 19, art. 131, in 12 CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 146 at 58; THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY, art. 4 of Part One, in
18 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 146, at 2.
148. Richard Stith, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: The Extraordinary
Power of Nepal's Supreme Court, 11 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 47, 48 (1996).
149. See THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN, art. 162,
in 6 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 146, at 32; CONSTITUTION OF FRANCE, art 89, in 7
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 146, at 89; CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY,
supra note 147. See also the discussion of the Romanian Constitution in Stephen Holmes
and Cass R. Sunstein, The Politics of Constitutional Revision in Eastern Europe, in
RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION, supra note 31, at 275, 290-91.
150. See CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF MAURITANIA, Title XI, art.
99, in 12 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 146, at 22-23; CONSTITUTION OF MOZAMBIQUE,
Part V, art. 198-99, in 12 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 146, at 82.
151. See CONSTITUTION OF BAHRAIN, ch. VI art. 120(c), in 2 CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 146, at 30. The constitutions of several states in the United States contain language
that appears to make certain provisions unamendable, e.g., by expressly removing them
from "the powers of government" and declaring that they will remain "inviolate"
"forever." See A.L. CONST. art. I, § 36; A.R. CONST. art. II, § 29; K.Y. CONST., BILL OF
RIGHTS, § 26; P.A. CONST. art. I, § 25. See O.K. Cushing, Inalienable Rights and the
Eighteenth Amendment, 20 COLUM. L. REV. 183, 187 (1920). See also A.R. CONST. art. II,
§ 3 (stating that the "equality of all persons before the law is recognized, and shall ever
remain inviolate"); A.Z. CONST. art. II, § 5 (stating that the rights of petition and assembly
for the common good shall never be abridged). However, one state court held that
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B. The Founding Period: The Permanent Constitution
As noted above, the text of the American Constitution currently
entrenches a single provision-namely, the equal representation of
states in the Senate. 152  The fact that nothing else is expressly
entrenched may suggest that the drafters of the Constitution and
those who ratified it believed that the rest of the Constitution,
including the Bill of Rights,"3 could be altered without limits of any
kind. This inference gains support from the fact that some of the
colonies had adopted constitutions that entrenched certain
fundamental rights.54  Thus, the possibility of entrenching
constitutional provisions of this kind was known to those who drafted
the Constitution. Finally, the notes of the Philadelphia Convention
reveal that the drafters considered and rejected entrenching
additional provisions."'
The historical evidence concerning the framers' beliefs, however,
is quite mixed on this point. Some scholars argue that the founders
and those who ratified the Constitution did not, in general, believe
that the Constitution should be altered.156  According to legal
amendments to such a provision can be adopted by the people, although not by any of the
three branches of government. See Opinion of the Justices, 263 Ala. 158 (1955); Eason v.
State, 11 Ark. 481 (1851) (invalidating a constitutional amendment properly adopted by
the Arkansas legislature because it conflicted with the state's Bill of Rights, but noting
that the people could adopt such an amendment in a convention).
152. See supra note 145-46 and accompanying text.
153. Including the Bill of Rights acknowledges the fact that many of the state ratifying
conventions made a Bill of Rights a condition for ratifying the Constitution.
154. See, e.g., PA. CHARTER OF PRIVILEGES OF 1701, art. I (entrenching freedom of
conscience for those who believe in God), cited in Arlin M. Adams & Charles J.
Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1559, 1567 n.37 (1989).
William Penn's "Frame of Government of Pennsylvania," April 25, 1682 (end of first
paragraph after the Preface) had a more expansive provision securing to the "freemen,
planters and adventurers of, in and to the said province, these liberties, franchises, and
properties, to be held, enjoyed and kept . . . forever." http://www.lonang.com/exlibris/
organic/1682-fgp.htm. (last visited Sept. 20, 2009).
155. The rejected provision related to federalism concerns, not fundamental rights.
See supra note 145.
156. See Cecelia Kenyon, Constitutionalism in Revolutionary America, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM: NOMOS 84 (Pennock & Chapman, eds. 1979); PAUL EIDELBERG,
THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: A REINTERPRETATION OF THE
INTENTIONS OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS 219-20, 240-41 (1968) (arguing that the
Constitution's generic character or essence should not be subject to change); Thomas E.
Baker, Toward a "More Perfect Union": Some Thoughts on Amending the Constitution, 10
WIDENER J. PUB. LAW 1, 5 (2000); Philip A. Hamburger, The Constitution's
Accommodation of Social Change, 88 MICH. L. REV. 239 (1989); Raymond Ku, Consensus
of the Governed: The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 535,
537-38 (1995) (citing Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176
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historian Philip Hamburger, "[a]lmost all the framers and ratifiers
assumed that constitutions should, by their nature, be permanent." '57
Hamburger argues that the difference between Federalists and Anti-
Federalists is the number of provisions that they sought to render
permanent by placing them in the Constitution, with the Anti-
Federalists seeking to place more protections for individual liberties
and the republican form of government than did the Federalists."8
Both groups, in other words, presupposed the permanence of some
constitutional provisions.
To explain the inclusion of Article V, which authorizes
amendments, Hamburger argues that advocates of constitutional
permanence hoped to use Article V to "perfect" defects in the
original design that could only be known through experience but not
to accommodate social change.59 So understood, including Article V
would not contradict the goal of permanence. Rather, it would be the
mechanism to promote the emergence of a "potentially permanent
scheme." 60
Given this logic, one can assume that those who believed in the
desirability of a permanent constitution sought to design the
document to withstand change to the greatest degree possible. One
strategy to achieve this goal would be for the text of the Constitution
to be spare, i.e., restricted to matters that would not, or should not be
subject to change as the nation evolved economically, socially, and
culturally. 6' By leaving these other matters to the discretion of
legislatures, which were free to revise and adapt laws with changing
times, the proponents of constitutional spareness may have hoped to
safeguard the permanence of the provisions that had been afforded
(1803), for the view that ".... the principles ... are deemed fundamental ... and they are
designed to be permanent.").
157. Hamburger, supra note 156, at 241. Hamburger acknowledges that not all framers
and ratifiers shared this view, id. at 242, but argues that "[i]n general ... neither
Federalists nor Anti-Federalists thought it appropriate for constitutional law to change in
adaptation to social developments." Id. See also id. at 300 (asserting that the "vast
majority of the framers and ratifiers, however, seem to have assumed that-
notwithstanding the possibility of using amendments to adapt the Constitution-
constitutions could and should be permanent.").
158. See Hamburger, supra note 156, at 240-42, 265, 298-300.
159. Id. at 300-01.
160. Id. at 300.
161. As an empirical matter, few countries have a constitution as short as the
Constitution of the United States. See Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional
Amendment, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION, supra note 31, at 237, 261.
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constitutional status. '62 Whether this strategy was successful is a
matter of dispute. Modern commentators note that the Constitution's
"elegant parsimony ' 63 has not prevented it from being virtually
amended repeatedly through means, such as judicial interpretation,
that bypass the procedures of Article V. '
Although the content of the entire Constitution was not
expressly entrenched in the document, the difficulty of satisfying the
procedures outlined in Article V can plausibly be seen as part of a
deliberate attempt to forestall, if not totally block, change to the text
as drafted and ratified.16 1 Pointing in the opposite direction is the fact
that at the time of the Founding, few nations made provision for
peaceful changes to government to be initiated by the people. Article
V may, therefore, be viewed as facilitating rather than obstructing
amendments, given the practices at the time. In support of the latter
view, historian David Kyvig argues that the understanding at the time
the Constitution was drafted was that "a high level of community
agreement could be eventually achieved," and thus the participants
"did not conceive of supermajorities as thwarting democracy."'
162. According to Hamburger, supra note 156, at 241-42, this was the understanding
and strategy of the Federalists. He contrasts the Anti-Federalists, who feared that the
Constitution would be the catalyst for social change-in particular, by creating conditions
that would undermine civic virtue. Id. at 265-66. As a consequence, the Anti-Federalists
insisted on including an enumeration of rights to prevent the erosion of "liberty and
republican government." See id. at 267-70. See also Peter J. Galie & Christopher Bopst,
Changing State Constitutions: Dual Constitutionalism and the Amending Process, 1
HOFSTRA L. & POL'Y SYMP. 27, 28 (1996).
163. This characterization is taken from PETER J. GALIE, ORDERED LIBERTY: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK 6 (1995).
164. For the view that there is a parallel process of informal amendments, as a result of
which, many more amendments have gone into effect than have been formally ratified, see
supra note 26 and infra notes 235-41 and accompanying text.
165. See Sanford Levinson, The Political Implications of Amending Clauses, 13 CONST.
COMMENT. 107, 121 (1996) (finding it impossible to view the purpose of Article V as
anything other than "making it extremely difficult to engage in formal amendment"). See
also SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE
CONSTITUTION GORES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 160
(2006) (stating that Article V practically entrenches the status quo and thus "works to
make practically impossible needed changes in out polity"). But see Monaghan, supra
note 58, at 125 (stating that the goal was to enable "a very small number" of the least
populous states to veto proposed amendments). For a range of opinions on the
practicality of the Article V process, see the excerpts from several state ratifying
conventions in 4 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 579-83 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph
Lerner eds., 1987). For a modern, empirical assessment of the difficulty of amending the
U.S. Constitution, as compared with the constitutions of other nations, see Lutz, supra
note 161, at 362-63.
166. KYVIG, supra note 102, at 61. See also Jos. R. Long, Tinkering with the
Constitution, 24 YALE L. J. 573, 578-79 (1915) (arguing that, since most amendments
Fall 20091 THEOCRACY IN AMERICA 101
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Certainly some of those who attended the Philadelphia Convention
predicted that satisfying the amendment procedures would not be
realistic.167  Given that more than 11,000 amendments have been
proposed in the nation's history,168 but only seventeen ratified (not
counting the Bill of Rights), preserving the original document has
clearly been the overall effect-at least as far as formal amendments
are concerned.'69
C. The Founding Period: The Amendable Constitution
In contrast to the preceding, other understandings during the
founding period emphasized the provisional nature of the
Constitution.70 Probably the most well-known illustration of this
strand of thought is Thomas Jefferson's suggestion for periodic
constitutional conventions to re-assess the fitness of the existing
Constitution. Because Jefferson believed that a majority of adults
living at any time would be dead in approximately nineteen years,
Jefferson maintained that "[e]very constitution, then, and every law,
naturally expires at the end of 19 years. If it be enforced longer, it is
an act of force and not of right."'' Jefferson's reason for seeking a
constitutional re-assessment at stated intervals was twofold: to enable
the basic law to "keep pace with the advance of the age in science and
experience" ''7 as well as to enable each generation to determine its
own government and not be bound by the will of former
proposed are variations upon a small number of subject areas and are reproposed
repeatedly, the actual number of distinct amendments proposed is not very great).
167. ORFIELD, supra note 134 (summarizing and discussing the debates).
168. See Flag Protection Amendment: Hearing before the Subcomm. on the Constitution
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2005) (statement of Prof. Richard D.
Parker, Harvard Law School).
169. See Stephen M. Griffin, Constitutionalism in the United States: From Theory to
Practice, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION, supra note 31, at 37, 50 (arguing that the
Constitution was not amended frequently during the nineteenth century because "little
was expected of the national government"). But see Long, supra note 166.
170. Hamburger notes such theories, but concludes they were not dominant. See
Hamburger, supra note 156, at 242. Yet he recognizes that the founders also read and
admired the writings of Montesquieu and other political theorists who stressed the ways in
which the characteristics of a population influenced and were influenced by the character
of the laws. See id. at 248-51.
171. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (1789), in 1 THE REPUBLIC
OF LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND JAMES
MADISON 1776-1826, 29-30 (James Morton Smith ed., 1995) [hereinafter REPUBLIC OF
LET ERS].
172. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Robert J. Garnett (Feb. 14, 1824), in 16
JEFFERSON, WRITINGS, supra note 54, at 14-15.
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generations."' In part, Jefferson believed that wisdom derived from
experience would enable future generations to perfect deficiencies
likely to inhere in the Constitution ratified in 1787.17' He also
believed that the law, including the basic law contained in the
Constitution, would have to change to respond to changed times and
circumstances,'175  although he opposed frequent constitutional
changes, asserting that "moderate imperfections had better be borne
with.
, 176
Other Founders believed in the desirability of constitutional
change without endorsing Jefferson's convention proposal. For
example, although Alexander Hamilton described the Constitution as
"the standard to which we are to cling," he affirmed the propriety of
amendments ratified in accordance with the Article V process.177 He
criticized the Articles of Confederation for requiring unanimity
among the states for an amendment to be approved, and he asserted
the desirability of "an easy mode ... for supplying defects which will
173. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 7
JEFFERSON, WRITINGS, supra note 54, at 454, 457 (asserting that each generation derives
its rights from nature rather than from its predecessors); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
John Wayles Eppes (June 24, 1813), in 13 JEFFERSON, WRITINGS, supra note 54, at 269-
270 (viewing each generation "as a distinct nation, with a right, by the will of its majority,
to bind themselves"). Somewhat later, Daniel Webster spoke out against binding future
generations. See Raymond Ku, supra note 156, at 553-54.
174. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to T. M. Randolph, Jr. (July 1787), in 6
JEFFERSON, WRITINGS, supra note 54, at 165, 167.
175. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to A. Coray (Oct. 31, 1823), in 15 JEFFERSON,
WRITINGS, supra note 54, at 480, 488. See also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel
Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in 15 JEFFERSON, WRITINGS, supra note 54, at 32, 41 (criticizing
European monarchs for failing to yield "wisely . . . to the gradual change of
circumstances"). Jefferson's idea should be distinguished from the motion, made by
Randolph at the Philadelphia convention, for a second convention held after the states
had reviewed the Philadelphia draft. Randolph believed that only a new draft revised in
light of amendments proposed by the states should be submitted to the states for
ratification. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 631-32 (Max
Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1996) [hereinafter FARRAND, RECORDS]. See also THE
FEDERALIST, supra note 42, NO. 85 at 524-27 (Alexander Hamilton) (rejecting the idea of
amendments before ratification); Paul J. Weber, Madison's Opposition to a Second
Convention, 20 POLITY 498 (1988) (arguing that Madison opposed the second convention
proposed by Randolph, but he was not opposed to a constitutional convention in the
future to make improvements thought necessary in light of experience living with the
original constitution).
176. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval, in 6 JEFFERSON, WRITINGS,
supra note 54, at 41. Jefferson also believed there were certain fundamentals that should
not be subject to change. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
177. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James Bayard (Apr. 1802), in 6 THE WORKS
OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 540, 542 (John C. Hamilton ed., 1850-1851) [hereinafter
HAMILTON, WORKS].
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probably appear in the new System. 17 8  Hamilton would have
preferred the amendment process to be easier than the proposal
agreed to by the participants at Philadelphia; hence, his own
recommendation that the second stage of the process require the
consent of only two-thirds of the states rather than three-quarters9
James Madison was less optimistic about the benefits of
constitutional amendments made without sufficient reflection because
such changes were likely to "destroy the symmetry & the stability
aimed at in our political system."' 8 The implication of his comment
about "symmetry" is that the basic structure established by the
Constitution should be preserved because its design reflected a
certain balance. Thus, Madison opposed "a reconsideration of the
whole structure [of] Government" or "a reconsideration of the
principles and the substance of the powers given. 181 Stability, in turn,
would be furthered both by avoiding such a reconsideration and by
"the prejudice in [the Constitution's] favor" resulting from the
passage of time. 82  Although these views led him to oppose
Jefferson's periodic constitutional convention proposal,'83 Madison
also warned against making the amendment process too difficult,
184
since amendments would be proper when "the provisions of the
178. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 175, at 558. George Mason and John
Randolph were also seeking an "easy" path to amending the Constitution. Id. at 631-32.
179. See 3 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 175, at 630 (written communication from
Hamilton to Madison at the conclusion of the Philadelphia Convention). Roughly a
decade later, Hamilton urged caution in utilizing the amendment procedure. See
Hamilton's abstract of points for Washington's Farewell Address, in 7 HAMILTON,
WORKS, supra note 177, at 572-73.
180. Letter from James Madison to John M. Patton (Mar. 24, 1834), in 9 MADISON,
WRITINGS, supra note 115, at 536.
181. See JAMES MADISON, Madison's Speech to the House of Representatives on June
8, 1789, in 5 MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note 115, at 370, 375.
182. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 4, 1790), in 5
MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note 115, at 434, 438. See also Sanford Levinson,
"Veneration" and Constitutional Change: James Madison Confronts the Possibility of
Constitutional Amendment, 21 TEX. TECH L. REV. 2443, 2450-53 (1990) (arguing that
Madison emphasized the stability resulting from infrequent amendments over possible
improvements from more frequent amendments). The difference between the views of
Jefferson and Madison were due, in part, to their differing views of human nature. See
James Morton Smith, Introduction: An Intimate Friendship, in REPUBLIC OF LETTERS,
supra note 171, at 27-28.
183. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 115, at 438-39;
THE FEDERALIST No. 50 (James Madison). See also id. No. 49 (rejecting constitutional
conventions called whenever two-thirds of two of the three branches propose them).
184. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 41, NO. 43 at 278 (James Madison) (the
importance of guarding against too many or too few amendments).
Constitution ... be found not to secure the government and rights of
the states against usurpations and abuses on the part of the United
States."'8
The danger of attempting to design a permanent constitution was
not overlooked by the drafters in Philadelphia. The legal authority
for their efforts, at least initially, was the directive to "amend" the
Articles of Confederation. Throughout the Convention, the Articles'
unanimity requirement for adopting amendments forced them to
wonder about the legitimacy of their own efforts and the appropriate
method for putting into effect the text finally agreed to by most, but
not all, delegates.8 6 In addition, since many believed that the
government they had fashioned would be imperfect, 87 the prevailing
view was to create a mechanism for change less onerous than that
required by the Articles.'88 Arguments from stability, in other words,
point in two directions-namely, to the desirability of permanence
and veneration, on the one hand, and to the necessity of a
psychological safety valve and a peaceful route to change, on the
other.
Stability and measured, peaceful change were not the only
purposes animating the design of Article V. Regional concerns may
have prompted adopting a two-step process with supermajorities
required at both stages. For example, there is evidence that Article
V's provisions were "designed so that no particular geographic region
could become hegemonic."'89 Related to this purpose, the process may
185. Letter from James Madison to Edward Everett (1830), in SELECTIONS FROM THE
PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES MADISON, FROM 1813 TO 1836 169 (J.C.
McGuire ed., 1853). See also Letter from James Madison to John M. Patton, supra note
180, at 536 (noting that the Constitution "may doubtless disclose from time to time faults
which call for the pruning or engrafting hand."); Wilson, 1 WILSON, WORKS, supra note
59, at 373, 377-78 (asserting both the people's right to change the constitution and the
importance of following established procedures and avoiding impulsive and thoughtless
acts).
186. See, 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 43-55 (1991). Bruce
Ackerman and Neal Katyal, Our Unconventional Founding, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 475
(1995). See also THE FEDERALIST No. 40 (James Madison).
187. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 41, NO. 14 at 104 (James Madison); id. NO. 40,
at 252 (James Madison); id. NO. 49, at 315 (James Madison). Cf id. NO. 85, at 523-24
(Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that the Constitution, although imperfect, was the best
possible under the circumstances and superior to any alternatives offered to date).
188. See KYVIG, supra note 102, at 56-61 (describing the discussions and characterizing
the role of Congress, as contrasted with conventions, as the main issue dividing the
participants).
189. Bendon Troy Ishikawa, Toward a More Perfect Union: The Role of Amending
Formulae in the United States, Canadian, and German Constitutional Experiences, 2 U.C.
DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 267, 269 (1996). See also Laurence Sager, The Incorrigible
Fall 20091 THEOCRACY IN AMERICA
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
also have been established to "safeguard minority interests, ' ' 9
especially in conjunction with creating a national government with
limited powers. According to some commentators, Article V was
more about the ongoing struggle between those who favored a
stronger national government and those who sought to preserve the
power of the states against the national government. 9' Thus, Article
V is of a piece with other measures created to establish and maintain
"the federal compromise."'9 This objective was achieved by
providing alternative paths to proposing and ratifying amendments,
one utilizing, the other bypassing state legislatures-a strategy that
would have been unnecessary if the sole purpose was to create a
mechanism to obstruct amendments to the Constitution while
appearing to facilitate them. In short, if one assumes that the goal of
the Framers was not to prevent change, but instead to encourage
careful consideration of potential changes and appeal to a wide
ranging consensus in the nation while incorporating some of the
checks and balances characteristic of other parts of the Constitution,
Article V is well designed to achieve these goals.
Whatever their private views regarding the desirability of a
permanent Constitution, the Founders did not, in fact, make it
unamendable, in whole or in part, with the arguable exception of the
equal representation of states in the Senate. 193 This fact alone does
not dispose of the question of the desirability of entrenching some
part or parts of the document now, although the Founders' reasons
for failing to insulate any other constitutional provision from change
permanently should be taken into account in considering the wisdom
of entrenchment. In particular, the Founders' views should
encourage us to consider whether circumstances today have so
changed that entrenching some provisions of the Constitution or the
Constitution, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 893, 953 (1990) (arguing that Article V may have been
designed to "protect the Constitution from the 'special perspectives' of certain states or
regions").
190. Ku, supra note 156, at 539-40. See also Monaghan, supra note 59 at 175.
191. See Baker, supra note 132, at 4. See Monaghan, supra note 58, at 133, 148. See
also Bruce Ackerman, 2006 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lecture: The Living Constitution, 120
HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1746-47 (2006).
192. KYVIG, supra note 102, at 60 (concluding that with Article V, "[t]he federal
compromise of the 1987 Constitution could be found in no more pure a form."); See
Brannon P. Denning, Means to Amend: Theories of Constitutional Change, 65 TENN. L.
REV. 155, 177-78 (1997) (emphasizing that reinforcing federalism was one of Article V's
major goals). Denning notes, however, that the Anti-Federalists opposed Article V, both
in Philadelphia and at the state ratifying conventions. See id. at 166-69.
193. U.S. CONSTITUTION art. V.
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Bill of Rights would be desirable, or even necessary, so as to preserve
the regime's original constitutional purposes under modern
conditions.
D. The Constitutionality of Entrenching Core Constitutional Values
Before considering the desirability of adopting entrenching
amendments, it is necessary to examine whether they would be
constitutional. The text of the Constitution does not speak to this
issue, and none of the three relevant parts of Article V is exactly on
point. The Article V provision insulating state suffrage from
elimination through an amendment does not provide an exact
template because the affected state can consent to foregoing this
right.9  Article V also contains two substantive entrenched
provisions. However, both were adopted with a limited duration"'
and, thus, do not directly speak to the possibility of making a
constitutional provision permanent. The closest parallel is the
amendment proposed shortly before the civil war that would have
added a permanently entrenched provision securing states' rights to
allow slavery.'96 However, the proposal was never adopted and, thus,
does not provide an example of an entrenching provision
withstanding constitutional challenge. In short, the terms of Article V
cannot be used as definitive authority either in support of or in
opposition to the constitutionality of adopting entrenching
amendments today.
To go beyond the literal terms of the Constitution to decide this
issue, it is useful to consider the principal ways in which the
Constitution can be conceived. Constitutional theorist William
Harris argues that there exist three basic ways of conceptualizing a
constitution: as grounded in transcendent values or other external
criteria; as a product of the historical traditions, acts, and
commitments of a particular community; and as a principled and
deliberative human construct.'9 Although understanding the
American Constitution as derived from transcendent values is beyond
the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that it would not do
194. See U.S. CONST. art. V, cl. 3.
195. See U.S. CONST. art. V, cl. 2.
196. The proposed amendment, known as the Corwin Amendment, prohibited any
further amendment to the Constitution that would interfere with the rights of states to
permit slavery. See Mark E. Brandon, The "Original" Thirteenth Amendment and the
Limits to Formal Constitutional Change, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION, supra note
31, at 215, 216-19.
197. HARRIS, supra note 45, at 129-31.
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violence to a constitution so conceived to adopt entrenched
provisions as long as they replicated the underlying transcendent
values.198
If the Constitution is conceived as conforming to Harris's second
alternative, i.e., as the aggregation of a particular community's
traditions, acts, and commitments, it is unlikely to display an inner
logic. Rather, it will derive its authority from its origin in the actual
and concrete experience of the community it ostensibly regulates. A
theoretical account of this alternative is found in the work of Hans
Kelsen, who elaborates a "dynamic" theory of law, in which law
(constitutional, statutory, or administrative) derives its validity from
the fact that it originates from a source with authority to make that
type of law, whether a formal institution or a tradition. 9 If law's
legitimacy is understood this way, according to Kelsen, "there is no
kind of human behavior that, because of its nature, could not be made
into a legal duty corresponding to a legal right."2°° As jarring as this
assertion may seem, it is a consequence of characterizing a regime
exclusively in terms of its origin rather than its content or purposes.
As applied to the United States, it may be hoped that structural
mechanisms, such as the separation of powers and various types of
checks and balances, will combine with procedural provisions to
generate desirable outcomes over the long run. In principle,
however, there is nothing inherent in the second alternative to
preclude the existence of traditions that favor one part of the
community at the expense of another or to prevent a group or
coalition of groups from satisfying the requisite procedural conditions
to utilize the law for ends harmful to the larger community or one or
more parts of it.20' By the same token, there is nothing to prevent the
passage of inconsistent laws, laws based upon inconsistent
assumptions, or laws promoting inconsistent results.
198. Entrenched provisions in this case might, however, be unnecessary because they
would be redundant. See id. at 130.
199. See HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 113-15 (Anders
Wedberg trans., Russell & Russell 1961) (1945). For Kelsen, constitutional law is
supported by, although not strictly deduced from, a basic norm that is not simply
procedural.
200. Id. at 113.
201. For a spirited attack on the view expressed in the text, see Lon Fuller, Positivism
and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 642-43, 644-46
(1958). John Hart Ely, who elaborated a more complex procedural theory than Kelsen,
sought to ensure substantively fair outcomes through procedural means. See JOHN HART
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST Ch. 4 (1980).
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From the perspective of the second alternative, then, any
amendment to the American Constitution that reflects the
community's practices and is adopted following Article V procedures
would be valid, whether it created entrenched provisions or not, since
the amending process would conform to the requirements set forth in
Article V, and Article V was itself adopted in accordance with the
Article VII procedure accepted by the states ratifying the
Constitution. 2 In short, incompatibility based upon the content of an
addition to the Constitution would be irrelevant as a theoretical
matter because traditions need not be consistent with each other and
203procedures can validate law without regard to substance.
Presumably there would be a practical need for an institution to be
given the authority to address significant cases of inconsistency
between an addition to the Constitution and what previously existed,
for example, by canons of interpretation, by considerations of public
policy, or by an exercise of discretion, so that people would know
which of the conflicting standards governs their conduct. But such
concerns would affect the implementation rather than the
constitutionality of the entrenched constitutional provisions.
The third alternative articulated by Harris, i.e., a constitution
deliberately designed to create a principled and coherent whole, is
likely to lead to different results. Like the second alternative, this
alternative rejects transcendent or universal truths and any other
criteria external to a constitution as measures of its validity.
However, unlike the second alternative, the third alternative
conceptualizes a constitution as the product of a reasoned effort to
design an entity based upon one or more principles and exhibiting
substantive consistency.2 ' As a consequence, additions to an existing
constitution would cohere with it or not, or would fall somewhere on
a continuum between cohering and not cohering with the existing
constitution. This feature is what leads Harris to describe the third
alternative as "a domain where conceptual analysis properly replaces
a reliance on fact or opinion, argumentation displaces both truth and
interest as the primary category of political validity, and
202. The Article VII procedure was accepted, over time, although not initially
authorized by the member states under the Articles of Confederation.
203. See KELSEN, supra note 199, at 113 (asserting that, for this understanding of the
nature of law, no law could be invalidated for being substantively inconsistent with
another law or a moral norm).
204. See HARRIS, supra note 45, at 130-31.
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interpretation poses itself against both subjectivism and objectivism
as unalloyed forms of knowing." 205
Which of the alternatives best explains the American
Constitution is debatable. That at least one of the drafters thought it
resembled the third alternative is suggested by Hamilton's query at
the beginning of the Federalist Papers, asking whether the nation was
capable of creating a regime from "reflection and choice," rather than
"accident or force., 20 6 Legal theorist Paul Kahn agrees, arguing that
the American Constitution was originally understood as embodying
both popular sovereignty and reason as foundational principles, with
the hope that a regime based upon reason could win the consent of
the population to be governed.27  For Kahn, this means that the
Founders ranked reason higher than popular sovereignty as
organizing principles of the regime created by the Constitution,
although they viewed both as necessary for a successful political
community. According to Kahn, however, by the time of the Civil
War, the understanding of the Constitution had evolved to the point
where popular sovereignty had become the dominant principle,
although the consent that was emphasized at that time was the act of
will involved in ratifying the Constitution during the founding
period. 28 Thus, even in the mid-nineteenth century, the Constitution
was understood as having a rational foundation and coherence.
From the perspective of the third alternative, amendments to the
American Constitution could be evaluated to assess whether or not
they are compatible with existing constitutional materials. For
example, many opponents of a Bill of Rights argued that all of the
rights enumerated in the proposal were already protected by the
Constitution, given that the national government was afforded limited
powers and that interfering with or denying the rights specified in the
Bill of Rights was not among its powers to begin with. If this
correct, then the first ten amendments were merely what
constitutional scholar Sanford Levinson calls "declaratory"
amendments, i.e., additions that make explicit what is already in the
existing Constitution rather than enacting changes.2 0 Levinson
205. Id. at 132.
206. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 41, NO. 1 at 27 (Alexander Hamilton).
207. See Paul Kahn, Reason and Will in the Origins of American Constitutionalism, 98
YALE L.J. 449, 450-58 (1989).
208. See id. at 463-67.
209. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton).
210. See Levinson, supra note 130, at 27-30; Sanford V. Levinson, Constitutional
Imperfection, Judicial Misinterpretation, and the Politics of Constitutional Amendment:
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contrasts these with "perfecting" amendments, i.e., changes
introduced to respond to some deficiency perceived in the
Constitution as it exists at the time of the change. Paradoxically, it
would seem that "perfecting" amendments could either improve or
worsen the existing Constitution, since they would give rise to a
substantive change in its content. This could occur because the idea
that constitutional materials have an inner logic speaks only to their
internal coherence and whether additions are consistent with what
already exists. The idea does not necessitate that the constitution in
question desirable in the first instance. Whether proposed additions
would cohere with the existing Constitution by virtue of making
explicit what is implicit or by adding something new not inconsistent
with what already exists would, of course, be a matter of discussion
and, ultimately, judgment. "
Where would entrenching amendments fit in this schema? The
relevant threshold determination is whether the content contained in
an entrenching provision is consistent or inconsistent with the content
of the Constitution. On this view, the entrenching feature would be
unproblematic if the content is considered consistent. If the content
seems inconsistent, an entrenching amendment would compel an
inquiry to determine which of the competing provisions should be
considered authoritative. Canons of interpretation are necessary to
resolve such disputes. For example, it might be assumed that later
provisions are authoritative unless in conflict with core or
fundamental features of the existing constitution. Accordingly, if an
entrenching amendment raised the minimum age for the office of
President by five years, the two provisions would conflict, but the
change would not constitute a change in the character of the regime
established by the Constitution. If the entrenching amendment were
to change the duration of the term for members of either chamber of
Congress or the President, there would probably be a debate about
the implications of such changes for the character of these institutions
in their own right as well as for the separation of powers and checks
and balances characteristic of the constitutional scheme as a whole. If
the entrenching amendment were to limit all judges and justices to a
single twelve-year term,2 2 an even more wide-ranging debate would
Thoughts Generated by Some Current Proposals to Amend the Constitution, 1996 BYU L.
REV. 611, 612 n.3 (1996).
211. See infra Part II.D.2.
212. In Germany, members of the Supreme Court are elected by the Parliament for
one non-renewable twelve-year term. See Donald Kommers, German Constitutionalism:
A Prolegomenon, 40 EMORY L.J. 837 (1991).
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ensue focusing on the purpose for which the drafters adopted life
terms for the federal judiciary, the consequences of judicial terms
being limited or indefinite, and the effect of changed circumstances,
such as the increase in longevity, on achieving or obstructing the
original or contemporary understandings of the judicial function.
A determination of the constitutional status of entrenching
amendments should also include examining the entrenching aspect of
an entrenching amendment as a matter of substance to ascertain
whether anything in the inner logic of the American Constitution
precludes entrenching some or all of its provisions. According to
Akhil Amar, the "substantive vision" underlying the Constitution is:
"popular sovereignty, which in turn is rooted in the substantive values
of equality (no citizen's vote should count for more than another's)
and neutrality (no substantive outcome-including the status quo-
should be specially privileged).""2 3
Amar's understanding of the values of equality and neutrality
suggests that people possess an inalienable right to change the
Constitution and that this is a right they cannot surrender.
Consequently, an entrenching amendment "would be generally pro
tanto unconstitutional.""2 ' An entrenched provision would violate
equality because it would deny future generations an equal say in
their government, and it would deny neutrality because the
consequence of entrenchment would be to "lock in" a specific theory
of the good.
Amar's statements imply that the Constitution is a coherent
arrangement with an inner logic because it embodies dominant
values-popular sovereignty, equality, and neutrality-and these
values are inconsistent with the very idea of entrenched constitutional
provisions. Therefore, Article V should be considered unamendable
in the sense that it cannot be removed or altered in a way that would
deny citizens the ability to change the Constitution. In other words,
the constitutional principle barring entrenchment should itself be
entrenched. Somewhat surprisingly, then, Amar also argues that free
speech, free press, and freedom of assembly are unamendable,
explaining that these are necessary conditions for constitutional
change, which popular sovereignty presupposes. He recognizes this
213. Amar, supra note 119, at 1045, n.1. Amar also argues that popular sovereignty
dictates that Americans retain the right to amend the Constitution using means other than
Article V. See Amar, supra note 25, at 489-92.
214. See Amar, supra note 119, at 1068. See also HARRIS, INTERPRETABLE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 45, at 179, 188.
215. See Amar, supra note 119, at 1045, n.1.
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position as "a seemingly paradoxical exception to the general rule
that amendments must not be unamendable."2 '6 In short, for Amar,
the inner logic of the Constitution is that certain First Amendment
values must be entrenched and only those values can be entrenched.2 7
The preceding discussion illustrates that the constitutionality of
having entrenched provisions in the Constitution cannot be
decoupled from a more fundamental issue. If the Constitution is
understood as a compilation reflecting the traditions and
commitments of members of the founding generation, unamendable
amendments might be conceptually at odds with some provisions of
the Constitution."' They could not, however, be inconsistent with an
identifiable core since this model does not presuppose such a core.
Over time, inconsistent provisions might well increase due to their
genesis in successive generations' values, traditions, and practices."9
On this interpretation, all provisions would be presumptively equally
authoritative, and a properly adopted amendment modifying or
eliminating an existing constitutional provision would necessarily be
more authoritative than the existing provision due to its later
provenance.
On the other hand, if the Constitution is understood as
embodying a reasoned and coherent basic structure of governance
containing core features that define the Constitution's identity, there
would exist conceptual standards for ascertaining whether
amendments, including entrenching amendments, would
fundamentally conflict with core aspects of existing constitutional
materials. This feature of the Constitution's identity should be
explored more fully than it has been to date, and the findings will
likely affect the solution to the questions posed in this Article. The
216. Id.
217. As Amar uses the term, entrenchment includes both explicit entrenching
provisions and implicit substantive constraints, of the kind discussed in Part I, supra.
Others have also argued that the structure or character of the American Constitution is
inconsistent with having provisions that are unamendable. See HARRIS, supra note 45, at
188-91 (arguing that the simple fact of the Constitution having a "whole design" would
prevent entrenched substantive provisions from being constitutionally valid).
218. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
219. As Amar uses the term, entrenchment includes both explicit entrenching
provisions and implicit substantive constraints, of the kind discussed in Part I, supra.
Others have also argued that the structure or character of the American Constitution is
inconsistent with having provisions that are unamendable. See HARRIS, supra note 46, at
188-91 (arguing that the simple fact of the Constitution having a "whole design" would
prevent entrenched substantive provisions from being constitutionally valid).
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need for such an inquiry in and of itself illustrates the daunting nature
of the threshold question of entrenchment's constitutionality.
For now, the following discussion assumes that entrenchment is
not per se unconstitutional and that specific individual entrenching
amendments might be ill advised without necessarily being
unconstitutional.
E. The Desirability of Entrenching Provisions
Assuming that entrenchment is not inherently incompatible with
the American Constitution, would it be desirable to adopt an
amendment that would make the religion clauses of the First
Amendment unalterable? To protect the clauses from being diluted
through modifications, an entrenching amendment would have to
identify the reach of the clauses precisely by referencing Supreme
Court opinions or otherwise articulating their meaning. The language
of the entrenching amendment or the materials referenced in it would
then provide a standard for determining whether a subsequent
amendment has the effect of modifying the entrenched doctrine.
A proposal to entrench the religion clauses would likely be
supported by Bruce Ackerman, the legal theorist who recommends
entrenching the protections contained in the entire Bill of Rights in
order to insulate them from alteration via Article V amendments.220
Ackerman believes that entrenching the Bill of Rights will help
restore the integrity of "certain rights of personal liberty" that have
been undermined as a result of government policies justified by the
war on terror.2 Constitutional theorist Walter Murphy would likely
agree that entrenchment is desirable because he believes that we are
condemned to the possibility of anarchy or mob rule absent the
ability to bind ourselves in the future.222 Murphy points out that a
constitutional democracy such as exists in the United States
necessarily contains a tension between the need to reflect and the
need to restrain the popular will. 223  On this view, entrenchment
220. See ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, supra note 186, at 16. See also id. at 319-21
(endorsing the idea of a more expansive "modern Bill of Rights" and arguing for the
desirability of entrenching the modern version).
221. Personal correspondence from Ackerman to the author (Mar. 31, 2008) (on file
with author).
222. Murphy, Merlin's Memory, supra note 31, at 188. For Murphy, there are a variety
of ways to entrench constitutional values, including implicit substantive constraints and
"the normative theory in the Constitution" as well as an express textual prohibition
against amendment. See id. at 175-80.
223. Id. at 187. Murphy also argues that the First Amendment may already be
entrenched by its terms, i.e., that "Congress shall enact no law .... Since an amendment
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actually reinforces popular sovereignty because it preserves the
fundamental values that prevent the popular will from actions that
could undermine popular government.
Explicit formal entrenchment would serve several purposes.
Symbolically, it would convey to the nation the gravity of the
Constitution's commitment to the entrenched values. Practically,
formal entrenchment would give pause to, if not fully dissuade,
people seeking to pass an amendment to reduce the protection
afforded entrenched values. This is because an entrenching
amendment would explicitly or implicitly authorize a government
institution to invalidate subsequent constitutional amendments
deemed contrary to entrenched provisions. As a result, the latter
would not go into effect even if they had been adopted using Article
V procedures. 2' Relatedly, as a consequence of the possibility of
invalidation of an amendment arguably at odds with an entrenched
provision, proponents of the subsequent amendment might be
deterred because of the uncertainty surrounding the new
amendment's constitutionality.
Consider the proposed "life begins at conception" amendments
discussed in this Article.226 If the religion clauses were entrenched
through an amendment prohibiting amendments constitutionalizing
the religious beliefs of particular denominations, proponents of a
conception amendment might conclude that their energies would be
better spent reducing abortions through other means rather than
undertaking an expensive and labor intensive nationwide effort to
adopt a conception amendment that might ultimately be judged
would create law, Congress could not participate in adopting an amendment. Id. Neither
could the states since the First Amendment now applies to the states.
224. Jed Rubenfeld might be thought to support the potential utility of entrenching
amendments because of his belief that "self-government consists of living under self-given
commitments laid down in the past to govern the future," rather than gratifying one's
present desires when these conflict with one's life's commitments. See Jed Rubenfeld, Of
Constitutional Self-Government, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1749, 1759-60 (2003). Rubenfeld
portrays constitutional commitments as constraints on the will of majorities and as
representing the enduring normative principles underlying the Constitution. JED
RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-
GOVERNMENT 174 (2001). However, he also contends that constitutional commitments
should be capable of revision through amendments when the need arises. See id. at 175-76
(asserting that a commitment cannot be established by a series of supermajority votes,
even if the votes were to be unanimous, since a popular commitment does not exist
"unless it succeeds over time: unless it takes and holds").
225. This assumes that the amendments would be challenged in court, which is certain
to be the case.
226. See supra note 8.
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unconstitutional. They might, for example, view supporting
educational programs to prevent unwanted pregnancies, providing
medical and nutritional assistance to women with unwanted
pregnancies, and counseling about adoption as an alternative to
abortion as more productive uses of their limited resources than
pursuing a protracted and uncertain constitutional battle.
A related practical effect of incorporating explicitly entrenched
values in the Constitution implicates their symbolic function. If a
ratified amendment is subsequently declared unconstitutional, or the
attempt to ratify such an amendment is abandoned out of concern
about its constitutionality, proponents of a conception amendment
would realize that the only way for the amendment to attain
constitutional status would be to create a strong national consensus to
contemplate adopting a new constitution. In countries with a history
of regularly replacing their constitutions, the prospect of adopting a
new constitution might deter, but not utterly defeat, those seeking to
alter the regime in a fundamental way. In contrast, the United States
Constitution is more than two centuries old and has attained the
status of a sacred text. Although Americans disagree about the
meaning of its abstract and foundational precepts, most agree that the
Constitution is the reason for the country's prosperity and stability
and, thus, that it should be preserved. Following this logic,
proponents of a conception amendment would have to confront the
radical nature of the policy they were seeking to constitutionalize and
the fact that their goal is antithetical to the religious tolerance at the
core of the American constitutional identity."'
Not all observers are likely to be sanguine about the benefits of
explicit formal entrenchment. The central policy argument against
entrenching parts of the Constitution is that doing so would subject
the country to the risk of unamendable provisions in circumstances
when they should be altered to accommodate social, economic,
political, or cultural changes. While limiting entrenchment to core
features of the Constitution could reduce this risk, such situations
could still arise. Take, for example, the sole entrenched provision in
the Constitution today-the protection of equal suffrage for states in
the Senate. The Founders probably did not foresee the time when
the population of some states would be seventy times the population
of other states, as was the case in 2000, given that the most populous
227. A further potential consequence of entrenching features of the Constitution
would be the evolution of the meaning of entrenched provisions through interpretation or
other informal means. See infra notes 229-34 and accompanying text.
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state in 1790 was roughly twelve times that of the least populous. 2 8
Had the Founders foreseen the modern disparities in population, they
might have made the state suffrage provision of Article V easier to
change. Now, because of the extreme disparities in the populations of
states, small states have disproportionate influence on national
decision-making and can bargain for hugely disproportionate
amounts of federal funding.229 Some critics claim that under the right
conditions, less than one-fifth of the electorate could elect over half of
the Senate.23°
Whether these or other consequences of the disproportionate
small state influence should be changed is debatable as a policy
matter. However, the special constitutional status of the equal state
suffrage provision is likely to consign such debates to virtual
irrelevance. 3 ' At the very least, then, we can say that entrenching
constitutional provisions would tend to relegate them to the back
burner of discussion and analysis. 32 More ominously, it could lock in
constitutional precepts with deleterious effects, such as the
Prohibition Amendment, had it contained entrenching language, or
228. See http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0004986.html (based upon U.S. Census data,
listing population by state from 1790 to 2006).
229. See FRANCES E. LEE & BRUCE I. OPPENHEIMER, SIZING UP THE SENATE: THE
UNEQUAL CONSEQUENCES OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION 228-29 (1999).
230. See Misha Tseytlin, Note, The United States Senate and the Problem of Equal State
Suffrage, 94 GEO. L.J. 859, 859-60 (2006). See also Suzanna Sherry, Our Unconstitutional
Senate, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 213, 213-15 (1995).
231. The issue has, nonetheless, inspired a certain amount of predominantly academic
debate. See LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION, supra note 165, at 50-62.
Some have argued that even the entrenched equality of state suffrage provision could be
eliminated. See PETER SUBER, THE PARADOX OF SELF-AMENDMENT: A STUDY OF
LOGIC, LAW, OMNIPOTENCE, AND CHANGE 119 (1990); Scott J. Bowman, Note, Wild
Political Dreaming: Constitutional Reformation of the United States Senate, 72 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1017-19 (2004). Douglas Linder argues that an amendment to remove the state
suffrage provision of Article V should be upheld because the amendment would be
"necessary to effectuate the broad design of the Constitution," i.e., that it be flexible and
open to change. See Linder, supra note 119, at 726-27 (arguing that flexibility is "more
basic" to the Constitution's design than the protection of state suffrage). Linder also
argues that the proposed amendment to give the District of Columbia representation in
the Senate should be upheld, if adopted in accordance with Article V, even though it
would effectively "dilut[e] the voting strength" of the remaining states, as long as the goal
was to redress the lack of representation of the District rather than to reduce the other
states' voting strength. Id. at 727. See also Mazzone, supra note 34; Lynn A. Baker &
Samuel H. Dinkin, The Senate: An Institution Whose Time Has Gone?, 13 J.L. & POL. 21,
68-70 (1997).
232. See MELISSA SCHWARTZBERG, DEMOCRACY AND LEGAL CHANGE 195-96
(2007) (arguing that if constitutional provisions were entrenched, the impossibility of
changing them would likely dampen discussion about them).
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the proposed Corwin Amendment to protect the institution of
slavery, which did contain such language, had it been adopted. 3' The
fact that three-quarters of the states ratified the Prohibition
Amendment within thirteen months of the House and Senate voting
to send the resolution to them is evidence that some types of
movements can create a momentum contrary to detached and careful
consideration. As constitutional historian John Vile has noted,
"extensive resort to such amendments might indeed spark revolution
or instill disrespect for the Constitution. '"o
A second reservation regarding entrenching amendments may be
raised by those who claim that the current difficulty in obtaining
Article V supermajorities has led to the development of a parallel
universe of non-Article V "amendments" to the Constitution.
Sanford Levinson is in the forefront of constitutional scholars noting
that the difficulty in satisfying Article V procedures has played a
critical role in prompting resort to other methods of amending
constitutional doctrine.235 For Levinson, Article V's "inflexibility" has
been one of the main reasons that fundamental constitutional changes
in the United States have repeatedly occurred through arguable
overreaching by political actors, such as legislators or executives, that
is then, in effect, ratified by judicial re-interpretations of existing
constitutional law.z6
233. See supra note 195. See also SCHWARTZBERG, supra note 231, at 139 (arguing
that constitutional change is necessary because of "human fallibility").
234. John R. Vile, Limitations on the Constitutional Amending Process, 2 CONST.
COMMENT. 373, 387 (1985). See John Ferejohn, supra note 141, at 512-13 (asserting that
"the authority of the courts themselves might be jeopardized by such efforts because it
would fall to them to uphold entrenched provisions against unified and large majorities").
235. See LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION, supra note 165, at 163-64.
Levinson notes as well that not all types of constitutional change can be made through
informal methods. For example, the electoral college, appointment of judges for life, and
equal representation of states in the Senate could only be changed by a formal
amendment. See id. at 164. See also Griffin, supra note 169, at 50-53. The non-Article V
amendments, in turn, enhance reverence for the Constitution, which then makes it even
less likely that the Constitution will be formally amended. Id. at 53.
236. LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION, supra note 165, at 163-64.
According to Levinson, this occurred in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819), The
Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635 (1862), Home Building and Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398
(1933), West Coast Hotel v. Parish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), and United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100 (1940), among other decisions. See Levinson, How Many Times?, supra note 130,
at 22-23 (suggesting that he shares the view of those who view McCulloch as an
amendment to rather than an interpretation of the Constitution); Id. at 24, (suggesting




Judge-made constitutional law, sometimes referred to as
"constitutional common law," '237 is not the only type of amendment to
the Constitution made through non-Article V means. Constitutional
change has also occurred through the actions of independent
administrative agencies and the expanding power of the presidency as
well as through what some scholars call "super-statutes," i.e., statutes
embodying fundamental norms that influence other laws and public
understandings in much the same way as norms included in the text of
the Constitution.238  Similarly, Stephen Griffin argues that
constitutional change resulted from the New Deal and Cold War
restructuring of the relationship between the three branches of
government, without the benefit of formal amendments-although he
attributes the cause more to reverence for the Constitution than to
the inflexibility of the Article V process.239 Some commentators have
dubbed these changes to the Constitution "informal amendments, '240
whereas for others, they form part of "the Constitution-in-practice."24 '
Both Levinson and Griffin deplore this state of affairs. Levinson
asserts that constitutional amendment through non-Article V
methods lacks transparency and that the "degree of fundamental
change is often covered up by being rationalized in incomprehensible
legal jargon that requires inordinate faith in the lawyers and judges
writing the opinion. 242  He also notes that the existence of
constitutional amendment through judicial interpretation may be
noticed and is "often met with outrage." '243 For Griffin, the primary
undesirable result has been to place more and more constitutional
doctrines "off-text," thereby rendering the constitutional text
237. See Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Amendments and the Constitutional
Common Law, in THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE
CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 229, 229 n.1 (Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana, eds., 2006);
David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 877
(1996).
238. See LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION, supra note 165, at 163-64;
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1275 (2001)
(characterizing super-statutes as "an intermediate category of fundamental or quasi-
constitutional law"). See also Ernst A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution,
117 YALE L.J. 408, 411-14 (2007).
239. See Griffin, supra note 169, at 54-55. See also ACKERMAN, supra note 186, 43-55,
(arguing that the New Deal period constituted a "constitutional moment" with the same
effect on constitutional doctrine as a formal amendment).
240. See LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION, supra note 165, at 164.
241. See Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST.
COMMENT. 427, 516-17 (2007).
242. Levinson, Our Undemocratic Constitution, supra note 165, at 164.
243. Id. at 163.
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increasingly uninformative about the realities of the American form
of governance.' " Further, constitutional change effected through
non-Article V means risks undermining the settlement function of
law, i.e., the role the Constitution (and all settled law) plays in
ensuring that people's behaviors are constrained by stable and
coordinated standards and "reducing the range of viable
disagreement" threatening law's legitimacy. 5 Were the country to
adopt entrenching amendments, various types of non-Article V
amendments would likely increase in response to the felt need to
adapt constitutional doctrine to changing circumstances. To the
extent that constitutional inflexibility is problematic, it would be
advisable to avoid entrenching amendments or, at least, to limit them
to a small number of largely uncontroversial core principles.
Other commentators, in contrast, view informal amendments in a
more positive light. Heather Gerken challenged Levinson's
assessment directly on the ground that informal amendment
processes preserve "the ongoing contestability of constitutional
law. 24 6  In Gerken's view, non-Article V constitutional processes
create a certain degree of indeterminacy that contributes to
strengthening the Constitution because no citizen can claim to have a
definitive interpretation of the meaning of the most important
constitutional provisions."' Moreover, because all groups can
reasonably anticipate a time when they may be able to reverse the
developments they oppose, they are likely to remain engaged and
loyal despite electoral or legislative setbacks. 48  An illustration of
Gerken's thesis might be the long-term strategy pursued by
conservatives opposed to many of the Warren Court's liberal
rulings-namely, gradually securing appointments of conservative
judges on the federal bench to counter, and even overturn, the
decisions of their predecessors. Although Gerken and others
emphasize the advantages of constitutional change outside of Article
V, 'it does not follow that they would endorse entrenching
amendments because the purpose of their writings is to clarify the
244. See Griffin, supra note 169, at 56. He concludes that "most significant twentieth
century constitutional change" has occurred "in the course of the interaction of the
political branches." Id. at 57.
245. See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional
Interpretation, 110 HARv. L. REV. 1359, 1376-77 (1997).
246. Heather K. Gerken, The Hydraulics of Constitutional Reform: A Skeptical
Response to OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 925, 937 (2007).
247. See id. at 939-40.
248. See id. at 938, 940-42 and sources cited.
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nature and value of non-formal constitutional change rather than to
recommend expanding its sphere.
A third objection to express constitutional entrenchment might
also rest on the belief that there are, in fact, no core features of the
Constitution that are essential to the American constitutional project.
If the Constitution has no core defining America's constitutional
identity, the justification for formal entrenchment is weakened, if not
dissolved altogether, because there would exist no compelling
theoretical reason to privilege permanently constitutional values that
merely represent ideas agreed to at particular times in the nation's
history. Rather, since such values derive their legitimacy exclusively
from the consent of the governed, they should be permitted to evolve
to reflect changing notions of constitutionalism and democracy.
Thus, proponents of entrenching amendments must develop at least a
probative argument that the American constitutional scheme contains
a set of foundational principles that, taken together, define the
nation's constitutional identity.
Finally, proponents of entrenching amendments must also
confront the practical question raised earlier by the discussion of
implicit substantive constraints regarding who or what institution
should be entrusted with determining which principles are core and
which proposals conflict with them. When raised in that connection,
neither the legislature nor the judiciary seemed suited to this task. "9
The problem would, however, be less acute in the case of express
substantive limitations for two reasons. First, in the case of
entrenching amendments, the public would also play a meaningful
role in the creation of the Constitution's unamendable provisions due
to the political dynamics surrounding an attempt to amend the
Constitution. Such public involvement could afford the claims of
unamendable standards more institutional legitimacy than would be
the case for implicit substantive constraints announced by the
judiciary. There are usually wide-ranging and spirited debates across
the country when an "ordinary" amendment is proposed, and public
attention is likely to be greater if the stakes are higher, i.e., in the case
of an amendment to be adopted and retained for as long as the
Constitution endures.
To illustrate, imagine that an amendment was adopted to make
the religion clauses unamendable and that the constitutional doctrines
thereby fixed were stated clearly and in detail. Imagine also that, at a
later time, an amendment was adopted to define human life as
249. Part I.D, supra.
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beginning at the moment of conception. In that event, were the
Court to hold the human life amendment unenforceable based upon
the First Amendment, as supplemented by the entrenching
amendment, the ensuing hostility to the Court's judgment would
likely be moderated by the awareness on the part of the proponents
of the human life amendment that the Court's ruling was grounded in
the express statement of a binding national, albeit earlier,
consensus.
250
The question of institutional legitimacy would also be somewhat
more manageable in connection with express substantive constraints
than implicit ones, in part, because the current Constitution already
contains an express substantive constraint (namely, the guaranty of
equal state suffrage unless a state consents to modification).
Consequently, the Supreme Court is already required to assess
whether a conflict exists that would prevent a new amendment from
being enforced if questions were to arise about the relation between
the new amendment and the state suffrage provision. 5' Moreover,
the Court has repeatedly been called upon since the Founding to
determine whether conflicts exist between legislation and the
Constitution. Although the practical consequences of invalidating
legislation inconsistent with the Constitution are very different from
those that would result from invalidating a constitutional amendment
based upon the Constitution, the determination in both cases would
appear to rely on the same faculty of judicial reasoning and judgment.
Although the express entrenchment strategy could provide
greater legitimacy for invalidating a "life begins at conception"
amendment than would the doctrine of implicit substantive
constraints, it suffers from additional problems of a different kind.
Two possible scenarios to implementing express formal entrenchment
exist. Either the entrenching amendment would be proposed with the
250. Of course, proponents of the human life amendment might still find the Court's
action an unacceptable misinterpretation of the religion clauses. The point in the text is
only that the Court would be on more solid ground if its holding was grounded in an
express amendment, hopefully accompanied by useful legislative history, as contrasted
with invalidating the human life amendment based upon implicit substantive constraints.
251. For example, if an amendment were adopted to afford the District of Columbia
representation in the Senate, but without the unanimous approval of all the states, it is
easy to foresee a court challenge to the amendment based upon the claim that the dilution
in voting power of the non-approving states would violate the state suffrage provision.
Alternatively, if the residents of Texas were to vote to accept the option, granted when
Texas joined the Union, to separate into five states with ten senators, the Supreme Court
would also undoubtedly be called upon to determine whether the authorizing resolution




clear understanding that its adoption would necessitate invaliding
future attempts to constitutionalize religious beliefs, such as the belief
that life begins at conception, or it would be approved without such
understanding.
If the jurisprudential implications of the entrenching amendment
were openly discussed, it would be extremely difficult, if not
impossible, for the entrenching amendment to be adopted today or in
the foreseeable future. For ratification under the procedures outlined
in Article V, three-fourths of state legislatures or three-quarters of
state conventions called specifically for this purpose must approve the
entrenching amendment. In this scenario, minorities (of state
legislators or convention delegates) in thirteen states could prevent
the adoption of the entrenching amendment. This possibility is not
far-fetched since it is precisely because of the persistence and extent
of attitudes favoring such an amendment252 that an entrenching
amendment would be desirable in the first place. There must, then,
be a considerable shift in popular opinion for the adoption of an
entrenching amendment to be feasible in the first place.
Paradoxically, the existence of such a shift in attitudes could make
widespread popular support for a conception amendment less likely.
If such a shift were to occur, it might still be desirable to pursue an
entrenching amendment to protect the Constitution against
subsequent shifts in public opinion back in favor of a conception or
other religiously based amendment. In the last analysis, this first
scenario for adopting the entrenching amendment is relatively
improbable because the condition precedent to its adoption, i.e., a
change of attitudes extensive enough to garner a supermajority of
three-fourths of the states, would presumably be slow to arise.
The alternative scenario is that the jurisprudential implications of
the entrenching amendment would not be thoroughly discussed or, at
least, not definitively agreed to. If that occurred, the proposed
amendment might be adopted more easily than under the first
scenario. However, this alternative would result primarily from the
circumstance that both proponents and opponents of a conception
amendment would believe that the amendment entrenching the
religion clauses would further their respective but conflicting agendas.
By the same token, the consequences of the entrenching amendment
252. A survey done by the Los Angeles Times in June 2000 found that 53 percent of
the people surveyed believe that human life begins at conception rather than at birth or
some time in between. See Matthew C. Nisbet, Public Opinion About Stem Cell Research
and Human Cloning, 68 PUB. OPINION Q. 131, app. at 144 (2004). The survey did not ask
whether those surveyed favored a constitutional amendment to that effect.
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adopted would be uncertain and might well depend on the
composition of the Supreme Court at the time a conception
amendment was adopted. As a result, the existence of an entrenching
amendment would not perform the desired function of dissuading
proponents of a conception amendment or of any other amendment
constitutionalizing a particular denomination's religious beliefs from
attempting to change the Constitution.
In sum, the threat posed by constitutionalizing specific religious
beliefs of a particular denomination would likely be reduced if a
formal entrenching amendment could be adopted that spelled out
with sufficient clarity the doctrines to be entrenched. Possible
positive ripple effects would include channeling citizen energy into
alternative measures to solve the concerns that initially led to
proposing such amendments. The process leading to the adoption of
such an entrenching amendment might have the long-term effect of
injecting greater clarity into public discourse concerning the centrality
of religious freedom and religious tolerance for the First
Amendment's religion clauses. Certainly, if the Supreme Court were
ever to invalidate a ratified amendment because of a conflict between
its content and the content of the pre-amendment Constitution, it
would be preferable for the Court to rest its decision on an explicit
constitutional provision rather than implicit substantive constraints.
At the same time, there are numerous disadvantages to
entrenching amendments, once ratified. First and foremost is the
difficulty in identifying subject areas in which permanent
constitutional provisions would be desirable. The example of Article
V's guaranty of states' equal representation in the Senate should give
proponents of entrenchment pause about one generation's ability to
see subsequent generations' needs accurately. In addition,
contemporary disputes about methods of constitutional interpretation
reveal the difficulty of stating with precision the exact contours of the
constitutional standard being made permanent. Merely
"entrenching" any one of the general provisions of the Constitution,
without spelling out in considerable detail what is being protected,
would merely lead to battles over the meaning of such provisions as
frequent as those that occur today and probably even more
contentious, since the stakes would be higher. Further, there is some
risk that one or more successful entrenching amendments would have
the unintended consequence of alienating significant groups that are
now willing to work peacefully for gradual change precisely because
of the Constitution's indeterminacy and openness to interpretation.
Finally, as described above, profound attitudinal changes would be
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necessary to make an entrenching amendment feasible in precisely
those instances where the need for such an amendment appears the
most urgent to the amendment's proponents.
Conclusion
The threat posed by proponents of constitutionalizing religious
values is real, although not necessarily imminent. This Article has
discussed two legal strategies for reducing the likelihood that such
provisions could be adopted or, if adopted, become effective. Both
strategies are attractive on the level of theory, yet both suffer from
profound, if not insurmountable difficulties of implementation.
In light of the considerable barriers to pursuing either strategy
successfully, it may be useful for opponents of constitutionalizing
religious values to consider alternatives to relying upon the Supreme
Court or some other institution to invalidate such amendments or
discourage their adoption through the threat of invalidation. In
particular, it may be useful to consider non-legal strategies for
reducing the threat in question.
Ultimately, the motivation for constitutionalizing religious values
originates in people holding certain religious beliefs passionately
coupled with their assumption that the Constitution is the appropriate
or the most effective vehicle for controlling the behavior of those who
do not share these beliefs. It is unlikely that such people will alter
their religious beliefs, nor would it be desirable to disparage their
beliefs in a regime that prides itself on guarantying religious tolerance
and personal freedom to the maximum extent possible, i.e., consistent
with the personal freedom of others. What must change, then, is the
belief that the Constitution should embody the religious or moral
beliefs of individuals, especially beliefs that are not necessary
ingredients of the political regime established by America's founding
document.
How could such shift occur? A necessary, if not sufficient,
condition is education about the essential nature of the Constitution
and the meaning of its individual guaranties. Although great
disagreement exists regarding the protections provided by various
provisions of the Constitution, most Americans believe that the form
of government it established has been responsible for the nation's
success for more than two centuries. Most people, however, are
relatively ignorant about the history of the Constitution, the
distinctive characteristics of the American Constitution, and how its
distinctiveness has contributed to its success. Most people are also
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ignorant of the history of the religion clauses and the values they
embody. One corrective to this situation entails a new emphasis in
civic education on the nature of the Constitution, its distinctive
approach to governance, and the consequences of its distinctiveness
for both political and non-political aspects of American life.
For example, teaching citizens about the American Constitution
might contain a discussion of the brevity of the document, as
compared with the voluminous constitutions of other countries; what
the founders hoped to achieve by not including social, moral, or
religious values in it; and the effects resulting from the Constitution's
brevity that have contributed to the nation's success over time.
Teaching citizens about the Constitution might also incorporate a
discussion of the difference between legal norms, on the one hand,
and social, cultural, economic, and moral norms, on the other.
Teaching the Constitution might also emphasize the history of
religious wars in England and Europe and examine the judgment of
those who drafted the Constitution that the most effective way to
prevent such battles in America was to limit the ability of groups to
use the machinery of government to impose their religious beliefs on
others.
In order to realize these goals, a civic movement to expand
understanding of the nature of the American Constitution would
need to influence the curriculum taught in schools-a goal arguably
as formidable as obtaining the two supermajorities necessary for a
constitutional amendment. In the short term, however, it is possible
to begin the process by emulating nonprofit groups that use
"Constitution Day" (September 17) and "Law Day" (May 1) as
occasions to teach about the Constitution in primary and secondary
schools around the country. Groups such as the American
Constitutional Society,253 the Constitutional Rights Foundation,254 the
Bill of Rights Institute,25  and others256 have created diverse teaching
modules to assist volunteers to bring greater understanding of the
Constitution to students at various stages of their educational
development.257  Influencing the popular understanding of what
253. See http://www.acslaw.org. (last visited Sept. 12, 2009).
254. See http://www.crf-usa.org. (last visited Sept. 12, 2009).
255. See http://www.billofrightsinstitute.org. (last visited Sept. 12, 2009).
256. See, e.g., http://www.discoverlaw.org/law-day-2009 (last visited Sept. 12, 2009).
257. See http://constitutioncenter.org/ConstitutionDay/Partner-Details.aspx?code=
110L5H2120; http://www.billofrightsinstitute.orgrTeach/freeResources. (last visited Sept.
12, 2009).
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function constitutions in general serve and the character of the
American Constitution in particular is the opposite of a quick fix.
But it might be the most effective long-term strategy for keeping
contested social, moral, and religious values, and public policy more
broadly, at the relatively safe level of ordinary legislative enactments.
Civic education has long been an overlooked strategy for law
reform for the obvious and accurate reason that the concept is
amorphous and the implementation would be dispersed across the
country. Furthermore, its effects would be gradual and difficult to
measure. Finally, and understandably, law reform focuses on law.
Recent work by constitutional law scholars has begun to stress the
importance of constitutional culture for the Constitution's legitimacy
and interpretation as well as the importance of popular opinion,
social movements, and non-institutional actors to explain the shifts in
constitutional meaning that have gained acceptance by courts,
lawmakers, and other public officials. 58 However, this growing
literature largely takes the non-legal part of the equation as a given.
This Article, the constitutional culture literature, and the insight that
the non-legal can decisively determine the path of the legal all suggest
that those who care about the future of the Constitution should work
to influence public opinion and social attitudes about law so that the
inevitable interaction between legal institutions and non-legal actors
will be civil and constructive.
258. See, e.g., Thomas P. Crocker, Overcoming Necessity: Torture and the State of
Constitutional Culture, 61 SMU L. REV. 221, 226-27 (2008); William Hoffer, The Age of
Impeachment: American Constitutional Culture Since 1960, 27 LAW & HIST. REV. 238-39
(2009); Robert Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term: Foreward: Fashioning the Legal
Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8-11 (2003); Post & Siegel,
supra note 140, at 374; Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict
and Constitutional Change: The Case of the de facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1323-24
(2006); Reva B. Siegel, Text in Context: Gender and the Constitution from a Social
Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 302-07 (2001).
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